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OCKHAM AND THE COGNOSCIBILITY OF GOD

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William of Ockham, philosophically speaking, stands at the end of an era. There can be found in his works, consequently, evidence of the main currents of thought which dominated the philosophy of that era. He is more than a little Aristotelian, and in his logic especially he manifests an enthusiasm not only for Aristotle himself but also for the Stagirite's Arabian commentator, Averroes. Yet Franciscan and follower of Scotus that he was, he shows, too, a strain of Augustinian voluntarism that in the end is more characteristic than is his attachment to Aristotle. But not only does he mirror the past. For all of his devotion to Scotus, he was at the same time Scotus's harshest critic; and he is able to break far enough away from his antecedents to become a portent of things to come.

This twofold tradition which Ockham embraces has led historians of philosophy to adopt two divergent attitudes in relation to this place in the history of philosophy. The first is by far the most prevalent. It is one which considers Ockham as the precursor of the decadence of Scholasticism, the nominalist, the man who began the flight from reality to symbolism.[1] The other, less prevalent and more modern, sees in Ockham a misunderstood realist, a true Aristotelian. In recent years books and articles have been published which have attempted to modify, or even to change diametrically, the prevailing historical opinion. E. A. Moody, for example, states that, if Ockham was a nominalist in logic, he was so only to safeguard a metaphysical realism.[2] E. Hochstetter is quite temperate in his judgment of Ockham,[3] while the late P. Boehner has constantly defended Ockham against his critics.[4] The Franciscan Institute of Studies has published various dissertations on the philosophy and the theology of the Venerable Inceptor, and all of these have been extremely favorable in their re-evaluation of Ockham's teaching.[5]

Rather than argue the case from the viewpoint of Ockham's logic, as so many have done, this article attempts to take a slightly different approach. By an examination of conclusions which Ockham drew in another area of philosophy the writer proposes to show that behind those conclusions and responsible for them is a nominalism that leads more readily to scepticism than it does to reality. It is with this in mind that attention has been focused on what Ockham had to say about man's ability to come to a knowledge of God. It is remarkable at times how close Ockham comes to Hume when he speaks of divine causality and causality in general. There is much also that seems to be a preview of Kant and of such modern existentialistic thinkers as Heidegger. For, like them, he has the problem of how man can know a transcendent being. Unlike them, Ockham thought he could solve the problem. What this article attempts to

[1]Cf. J. Maréchal, S.J., *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*, Cahier I (3e éd. Bruxelles-Paris, 1944), pp. 223-44, E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, p. 88. C. Michalski, "Les courants philosophiques et sceptiques," *Bulletin de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres* (Cracovie, 1920), pp. 59-88. G. Manser, "Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spec. Theologie* (1912), pp. 405-37. J. Becher, S.J., "Gottesbegriff und Gottesbeweis bei Wilhelm von Ockham," *Scholastik* (1929).

[2]*The Logic of William of Ockham* (London, 1935).

[3]*Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1927). Cf. also the article, "Nominalismus?" in *Franciscan Studies* for 1949.

[4]"Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William of Ockham," *Traditio* (1943), pp. 223-75.

[5]D. Webering, O.F.M., *Theory of Demonstration according to William of Ockham* (New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1953). S. Day, O.F.M., *Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (1947).

[6]"Circa tertium dico quod omnes veritates necessariae homini viatori ad aeternam beatitudinem consequendam sunt veritates theologicae . . . ex ista sequitur, quod aliquae veritates naturaliter notae seu cognoscibiles sunt theologicae, sicut quod Deus est, Deus est sapiens, bonus, etc." (*Quaestio Prima Principalis Prologi*, F).

The quotations from Ockham used in this article are taken from his *Commentary on the Sentences* published at Lyons in 1495. P. Boehner, O.F.M., has edited various questions from the *Sentences*. Cf. *Franciscan Studies* for 1941, Nos. 1 and 2; *New Scholasticism* for 1942.

[7]"An viator possit aliquod nomen imponere ad distincte significandum divinam essentiam? Quod significat Deum et nihil aliud, distincte Deum significat. Sed multa nomina Deum significant et nihil aliud, et illa sunt imposita a viatore" (*I Sent.*, 22, 1).

[8]"Viator potest imponere nomen ad distincte significandum Deum. Hoc patet quia quicumque potest vere intelligere aliquid esse distinctum ab alio, potest instituere nomen ad illud distincte significandum. Sed viator potest intelligere Deum esse distinctum ab omni alio. Ergo" (*ibid.*).

[9]"Deus non potest cognosci in se, ita quod ipsamet divina essentia terminet immediate actum intelligendi nullo alio concurrente in ratione objecti" (*ibid.*, 2, 9, P).

[10]*Ibid.* Ockham is speaking of an abstractive knowledge, of course, as one which demands a previous intuition of the existing singular.

show is that not only was his attempt a failure, but that from the very beginning it was doomed to failure because of the theory of knowledge on which it was based.

1. Can God Be Known by Human Reason?

That God could be known by human reason, or better, perhaps, by human mind, was never doubted by Ockham. There are truths which man must know, if he is to save his soul; and some of these necessary truths can be known naturally, such as that God exists, that He is wise and good, and so on.[6] Furthermore, we can talk about God; we use a special name to designate Him, and that name is validly imposed. To name a thing it is sufficient to know that thing as being distinct from everything else. This is certainly possible for the human mind with regard to God.[7] Against the objection that to know a thing one has to know clearly what the name signifies, Ockham replied that "clearly" here means only that the name can refer to God and to nothing else. But there are many such names which can refer only to God and which we use constantly. In this sense, then, there are names which clearly signify God, but there are behind those names concepts which can be properly applied to God.[8] As we shall see later, it is the nature of such concepts which causes the difficulty. However that may be, one thing is immediately evident; namely, that there is no concept which results from an immediate apprehension of the divine essence. "God cannot be known in Himself in such a way that the Divine essence would terminate the act of understanding immediately, without anything else concurring as an object." [9]

Such a knowledge of God by direct apprehension would make it impossible for anyone to doubt the existence of God. And this is obviously against the facts. Furthermore, such a concept would be one of two kinds, either intuitive or abstractive. It could not be intuitive, since such a concept is reserved for the blessed. Nor does it help to say that it is an abstract concept, since every abstraction supposes an intuition.[10]

In the *Prologue to the Sentences* Ockham admits the possibility of an exception to this rule, for he states that an abstractive and distinc-

tive knowledge of God is possible even here on earth and can be communicated by God to the *viator* independently of any previous intuition of the Godhead. It is true that intuitive knowledge is an essential cause of any abstract knowledge, but it is only an extrinsic cause. And whatever God can do through the mediation of an extrinsic cause, He can also do immediately and alone. He could, therefore, communicate to the *viator* an abstractive knowledge of Himself without a previously communicated intuitive knowledge. Only this last is absolutely impossible for the person who does not as yet possess the beatific vision.[11] Gabriel Biel in his commentary on the matter states that Ockham is speaking here of something that could only take place supernaturally, as is evident from the words *per potentiam divinam*. Naturally such a knowledge—abstractive without a previous intuition—is impossible.[12]

2. Can God Be Known by Means of a Proper Concept?

Secondly, we cannot know God by means of a concept which is proper to Him alone and simple in its nature. Such a concept presupposes that the object has been previously and inductively known.[13]

[11]"Dico quod Deus de potentia Dei absoluta potest tali duplici notitia cognosci, ita quod una sit intuitiva et alia abstractiva. Si abstractiva, non potest esse sine intuitiva Dei; ergo intuitiva esset causa essentialis respectu abstractiva, sed non nisi extrinseca; et quidquid potest Deus mediante causa extrinseca, potest immediate per se. Ergo potest facere abstractivam sine intuitiva. Ex praedictis concludo, quod notitia Deitatis distincta est communicabilis viatori manente viatori, quia sola intuitiva repugnat viatori. . . . Ergo si abstractiva potest fieri sine intuitiva, sequitur, quod abstractiva notitia distincta Deitatis potest esse in viatore manente viatore" (*Quaest. Prima*, I, 2).

[12]"Dicitur per potentiam divinam quia naturaliter est impossibile" (*In Primam Quaestionem Prologi*).

[13]"Non potest (Deus) cognosci a nobis pro statu isto in aliquo conceptu simplici proprio sibi. . . . Nihil cognoscitur a nobis taliter nisi praecognoscitur inductive" (*I Sent.*, 2, 9 R).

[14]"Primo distinguo de primo objecto intellectus nostri quod est primum primitate generationis, et hoc est quod terminat primum actum intelligendi. Quod est primum primitate adaequationis, illud quod praedicaretur de omni per se intelligibili. Quod est primum primitate perfectionis. Deus non est primum cognitum secundum a vel b" (*ibid.*, 0).

[15]"Omnis res, si cognoscatur, cognoscitur in se vel cognitione propria sibi vel aequivalenti, vel in aliquo conceptu. Deus non cognoscitur in se pro statu isto. Tum quia Deus non cognoscitur a nobis in particulari neque in natura propria. Tum quia omnis notitia rei in se abstractiva naturaliter acquisita praesupponit intuitivam" (*ibid.*, 3, 1).

[16]"Cognitio Dei ex creaturis duplex est, scil. naturalis et rationalis. Prima est cognitio Dei cum primis intentionibus entis concepta statim et naturaliter. Secunda est vis rationativa deductionis animadversio. Loquendo de ista secunda cognitione dicitur quod Deus non est primum quod homo cognoscit sed ultimum. Loquendo primo modo dicitur quod Deus est primum cognitum a nobis naturaliter" (*ibid.*).

What is the nature, then, of this concept of God which lies behind the various names we use to designate Him? In speaking of the first object of the human intellect Ockham makes a distinction between that which lies behind and is known in every predication about a *per se* intelligible and that which is the most perfect object of the intellect.[14] God does not terminate our act of understanding. That is a material quiddity. Neither is it the concept of God which lies behind every predication and makes every predication intelligible. Everything that is known is known either in itself or in a concept proper to it or in some other kind of concept. In our present state God is not known to us as He is in Himself. The reason is that God is not known to us in particular nor in His own proper nature.[15]

Considering an objection, Ockham becomes still clearer. The objection cited is one which takes the position that the knowledge of God from creatures is of two kinds. The first kind is a knowledge which is associated with the prime notions of being, the *primae intentiones entis*. The second is a rational and deductive knowledge. Speaking of the second type of knowledge the objector and Ockham admit that in this sense God is the last object of the intellect and not the first. Of the first type of knowledge, which includes the concept of God among the first notions possessed naturally by the human mind, a proof is submitted. Just as the senses proceed naturally from the less determined to the more determined, from body to animal to man and to this man, so the intellect proceeds from an indeterminate knowledge of being to a more determinate knowledge of this being. The more indetermined an intelligible is, the sooner it is known by the intellect. As it becomes less indetermined and more restricted, more and more acts of the intellect are required. And since, as far as we are concerned, God is most indetermined, He is the first object known by the human intellect. Ockham's answer to this objection is a simple denial that our cognitive process follows such a course. He asserts on the contrary that intellection begins with the singular.[16]

If this is true, there is only one possibility left for the human mind to acquire some knowledge of God, and that is by way of singular, created objects. Ockham sums up his position as follows:

Everything that is knowable by us is known either in itself, or

in a concept which is simple and proper to that thing, or in a concept which is complex but still proper to that object, or, finally, in a concept which is common to the object and other things as well.[17]

We have already seen him rule out the first two types of concept. The third is also rejected because such a complex but still proper concept would merely be a composition of simple and proper concepts. Hence, all that remains is that God can be known in and by means of a concept which is common to Him and other things as well. Nevertheless, this concept of God is not merely an extrinsic denomination, but a real, quidditative concept. Ockham reasons as follows. This concept is either quidditative or denominative. If we suppose that it is denominative, then that to which the concept is attributed is itself either quidditative or denominative. And so on to infinity. But such an infinite process is impossible. Therefore, the concept must be quidditative.

This quidditative concept of God is not, however, an analogous one. Against Henry of Ghent Ockham argues that to posit an analogous concept of God is to posit a proper concept of Him. He takes proper here to mean a concept which not only refers to God alone—he will admit such a proper concept of God—but one which gives us some knowledge of what God is in Himself. His reason for rejecting such a proper concept of God is precisely the same as that for rejecting an analogous concept of God. An analogous concept of God would mean that God was known in particular. And that is impossible.[18] Neither the divine essence nor anything intrinsic to the Godhead can be known by us in such a way that nothing else is present in the object, for that would mean intuition of God.[19]

[17]"Omne cognoscibile a nobis aut cognoscitur in se aut in conceptu simplici sibi proprio aut conceptu composito proprio . . . aut conceptu communi sibi et aliis. Et hic conceptus est quidditativus ut opponitur denominativo. Nam si non est quidditativus, tunc est denominativus. Deinde illi cui attribuis illum conceptum denominativum est aut quidditativus aut denominativus. Sed non valet processus in infinitum" (*ibid.*, 2, 9, S).

[18]*Ibid.*, 3, 2.

[19]"Nec divina essentia nec divina quidditas nec aliquid intrinsecum Deo nec aliquid quod est realiter Deus potest cognosci a nobis ita quod nihil aliud a Deo concurrat in ratione objecti" (*ibid.*, F).

[20]"Secundo dico essentia divina potest cognosci a nobis in aliquo conceptu composito et hoc in conceptu cujus partes sunt abstrahibiles a rebus" (*ibid.*).

3. The Quidditative Concept of God

What does quidditative mean, then, and in what sense is a proper concept of God possible for the human mind? Ockham defines the God-concept simply as a concept which is both proper and composite and one whose parts are able to be abstracted naturally from things.[20] Just as the creatures can be known in some note which is common and simple, so also can God, because otherwise He would be completely unknowable. Now, when there are many things all having the same note in common, those many things refer back properly to that thing which possesses that common note as its distinguishing characteristic and to it alone; for the other things have their distinguishing characteristics which differentiate them from one another. Hence all those things can refer back only to that one thing in whose characteristic note they share. Now, there are many concepts that are simple and can be abstracted naturally, any one of which is proper to God and creatures. But since many creatures share these concepts they refer back always to that object whose distinguishing characteristic they are. And when combined, all these concepts make one complex concept which is proper to God alone. And since it can be known that that concept can be verified with regard to an object whose characteristic note it is, God can be known in that concept. For example, from many beings a concept of being can be abstracted which is proper to God and to all other things. In the same way there can be an abstract concept of wisdom. The same is true of the concept of goodness, insofar as the concept of goodness is distinguished from that of wisdom. Yet every such concept can be properly verified only with regard to God, and to Him alone will the combination of concepts properly refer. He alone is wisdom, goodness, and being.

This should not be taken as a proof for God's existence, a proof based on participated perfection. It is no such thing. Ockham is not arguing from participated formal perfections to the existence of the All-Perfect. He is dealing only in concepts and is saying only that the concepts which the mind abstracts from creatures can be applied to something we call God. Whether that something exists or not is not his concern here. It is simply a question of what we

can know about the nature of God. The concept common to many in its origin can now refer only to God. The aggregate of concepts can be predicated only of God. Yet each concept has come originally from creatures. It is quidditative in the sense that it tells us something about the nature of the creature. It is composite in the sense that it is based on the union of many individual concepts of many singulars. Yet when predicated of God, it is also a proper concept, for it can now refer only to God and to nothing else.[21]

We can ask here whether this concept is also quidditative in the sense that it tells us something of what God is in Himself. Is it really God whom we know, or is it only this aggregate of concepts which we have formed from creatures? There is no hesitation in Ockham's answer.

> I say that we cannot know in itself either the unity of God, or His primacy, or His infinity, or His power, or His goodness, or any other divine perfection. That which we know directly is some concepts which are really not God, but which we use in the propositions we formulate about God.[22]

[21]"Sicut creatura potest cognosci in aliquo communi simplici ita potest Deus. Quia aliter nullo modo esset a nobis cognoscibilis. Sed quando sunt communia multa habentia aliquod idem contentum, omnia illa communia sic accepta faciunt unum proprium illi, quia ex quo sunt distincta communia oportet quod aliquid contineatur sub singulo quod sub nullo aliorum continetur. Ergo omnia illa communia sic accepta nulli alii possunt convenire. Sed multi sunt conceptus simpliciter simplices naturaliter abstrahibiles quorum quilibet est communis Deo et alicui alteri. Ergo omnes illi sic accepti faciunt unum conceptum proprium Deo. Et ita cum possit cognosci quod ille conceptus de aliquo verificatur, Deus in illo conceptu cognoscetur. E. G., ab entibus possit abstrahi conceptus entis qui est communis Deo et omnibus aliis entibus. Similiter potest abstrahi conceptus sapientiae qui est praecise communis sapientiae creatae et increatae. Sic de bonitate. Et hoc secundum quod bonitas distinguitur a sapientia. Et omnis iste conceptus sic non poterit verificari nisi de Deo. Ex quo proposito nulla sapientia creata est bonitas creata nec e converso. Et ita potest concludi quod aliquod ens est bonitas et sapientia. Et sic de aliis quae vocantur attributa. Sequitur quod Deus isto modo cognoscitur in conceptu composito sibi proprio. Et hoc non est aliud nisi a creaturis abstrahere multos conceptus communes Deo et creaturis. Et concludere particulariter de uno conceptu simplici communi sibi et aliis ad unum conceptum compositum Deo proprium" (*ibid.*, 3, 2, G).

[22]"Dico quod nec unitatem Dei nec primitatem nec infinitatem nec potentiam nec bonitatem nec perfectionem divinam possumus in se cognoscere. Sed illa quae immediate cognoscimus sunt aliqui conceptus, qui non sunt Deus realiter, quibus utimur in propositionibus pro Deo. Vel cognoscimus cognitione communi plura quam Deum. Et illa entitas quae est Deus non potest a nobis cognosci in se" (*ibid.*, M).

[23]*Ibid.*, 2, 4, M.

[24]S. Day, O.F.M., *Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1947).

[25]*III Sent.*, 9, T.

Such an answer is fully in accord with Ockham's theory of cognition. In another place he states clearly that any science is about propositions, for these are the objects of the science and only these are known.[23] I do not think that Ockham is saying that all knowledge is restricted to a knowledge of propositions or of concepts. He would certainly insist that the propositions which are known are verified in reality in this or that existing singular. This existing object, however, is known by an intuition. Once we get beyond the realm of the intuitive apprehension and pass over into the realm of the judgment, the object of that judgment—or, better, the truth it expresses—does not exist as a concrete singular but as an object in the mind at which the mind terminates. And one of the modern commentators on Ockham makes it still clearer. His reason for positing intuition of the existing singular was an attempt to reach certain knowledge of an existing world. He regarded the judgment as a mere combining of concepts and an abstract concept in itself as an object of knowledge.

> Thus we see the problem of intuitive cognition being located at the very heart of the problem of certitude. For Ockham in effect is asking himself: How can I be sure of the truth of contingent propositions? . . . For example, if all I have is a concept of whiteness and a concept of Socrates, how can I ever combine these two concepts and know for sure that Socrates is white? A type of cognition which abstracts from existential qualifications of the subject would never suffice for an evident proposition about the existential facts of that subject. Therefore to explain the fact of evident cognition of contingent facts, we must posit another type of cognition which gives us precisely what abstractive cognition ignores; namely, the existential qualifications of things, their *hic* and *nunc*.[24]

Everything except the intuition of the here and now existing singular is for Ockham an abstract concept, and it is about this concept that he philosophizes. Being, the subject of metaphysics, is a concept of the mind,[25] and hence his metaphysics becomes necessarily a science of essences and possibilities. All knowledge of existence is limited to a knowledge of the empirical world of creatures because intuition is limited to such a world. As we have seen, Ockham had

drawn a clear distinction between this intuitive knowledge and abstract knowledge. Having ruled out all intuitive knowledge of God, only abstract knowledge was left. Even here the object of such abstract knowledge is not God but the creature, and even the creature is only a secondary object. The primary object is the concept itself, for there is nothing in the experiential order corresponding to such a concept taken as such. The God-concept is in a sense objectified and stands apart from creatures on the one side, too perfect in its composition to be identified with any of them, and distinct from God on the other side, too imperfect and abstract to give us any real knowledge of what He is like. Such a concept is a logical construct which stands for God and tells me all that I shall ever know about Him.

4. The Univocity of the God-Concept

Now it is one thing to say that we cannot know God as He is in Himself and quite another to say that all we know is a concept of God taken from creatures. Ockham had rejected all analogy and had made the predication of being a univocal one.[26] He could divide the concept of being into two main species, one of which was the created, the other the increated. It is well to note here that he never meant to suggest that the reality itself was univocal. God is not being as creatures are being. But Ockham thought that, unless the concept were univocal, the human mind could never come to a knowledge of God. For Ockham the world was not just a collection of singular existents but a collection of absolute and independent existents, none of which had any necessary connection with any other. Again he did not deny that such a connection did in fact exist, but it need not; and as far as our knowledge went such a connection could not be demonstrated.[27] From the knowledge of one such singular existent

[26] *I Sent.*, 2, 9, P.

[27] "Ex istis sequitur quod notitia intuitiva, tam sensitiva quam intellectiva, potest esse de re non existente. Et hanc conclusionem probo aliter ac prius sic: omnis res absoluta distincta loco et subjecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per potentiam divinam absolutam existere sine illa quia non videtur verisimile, quod si Deus vult destruere unam rem absolutam existentem in coelo, quod necessitetur destruere unam aliam rem existentem in terra. Sed visio intuitiva, tam sensitiva quam intellectiva, est res absoluta distincta loco et subjecto ab objecto. Sicut si video intuitive stellam existentem in coelo, illa visio intuitiva, sive sit intellectiva sive sensitiva, distinguitur loco et subjecto ab objecto viso; ergo ista visio potest manere, stella destructa" (*Prologus ad Commentarium in Sent.*, I, 1).

[28] *III Sent.*, 9, R.

[29] *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 32.

no one could infer the existence of any other thing. But when one does become aware of the existence of other things, he could not know them unless he were able to apply to them a term which is common to these other things and the ones he already knows.[28]

When it comes to God, then, unless there is a concept which in some way, at least, refers to both God and creatures. God could never be known from creatures. He posited, therefore, a univocal predication of such concepts as being, wisdom, and goodness with regard to God and creatures. An analogous predication, thought Ockham, would lead to one of two unanswerable difficulties. Either God would be exiled completely from the realm of human knowledge, or we would end up with a proper concept of the Godhead. In every analogy there is something which is the same and something which is different. If the first is insisted upon, we should arrive at a concept of God which was proper to Him as such. If the second were insisted upon, then a concept such as being, for example, would be predicated in a manner completely different of God and creatures.

So Ockham chose univocity and a concept of being which could be predicated univocally of God and creatures, at least to the extent that the concept was common to both in two respects. God and creatures were alike in this, that they were not nothing; and, secondly, whatever degrees of existential perfection any creature possessed, God also possessed that same perfection. Ockham had chosen univocity primarily as a means of avoiding an unknown God.

At the same time, to avoid being accused of pantheistic inclinations, he had to make the fact clear that in the real order God and creatures were essentially different. The univocal concept, then, which was predicated of God and creatures did not really signify God; for univocal concepts, as St. Thomas says, are restricted to those things which participate in the same genus.[29] But God belongs in no genus. Hence all that Ockham could eventually say was that he had a concept of God taken from creatures. This concept as a composite of creaturely perfections could refer only to God. Yet, when broken down into its component parts, the concept really said nothing more about God than about the various creatures from which it came. It simply said more perfections, not greater perfections. An analogous concept says something about its object. In this case a univocal con-

cept says nothing about its object but merely stands for that object; and Ockham admits as much. A concept is quidditative, he says, in respect to something which stands for the quiddity and not in respect to something else which is merely denominated from the quiddity. In the proposition that God is wisdom, wisdom stands for the Godhead, which is not a subject.[30] The real subject is the creature from which Ockham first understood the meaning of wisdom. When this wisdom is predicated of God, it is still created wisdom—at least as far as the meaning goes—and one knows no more about the divine wisdom than one did before making the predication. Only the concept of human wisdom is known, and behind that stands infinite wisdom, untouched by the human intellect, unknown, and incapable of being known. The same is true of all the other perfections predicated of God. All that Ockham did was to assemble an aggregate of human concepts and then project this aggregate beyond its various human subjects and say, "This stands for God." Whether God is really like that it is simply impossible to tell.

It is no wonder, then, that he finds the triple way of ascending to a knowledge of God of little value. St. Thomas in discussing the *triplex via—affirmationis et negationis et eminentiae*—had said that in the negation was contained something positive; that, while we never understood what God was in Himself, by denying of Him certain imperfections we were really affirming other positive perfections.[31] In the *Summa Theologiae*[32] Aquinas states that the perfections we assert of God have a positive signification, that they are, in fact, predicated of God more perfectly than of creatures, at least insofar as what is signified is concerned. Ockham found this unacceptable. Such predication would then have something strictly proper about it. This for him meant an intuition of God as He is in Himself. Consequently he rejected it. He refers to the *triplex via* in the *Sentences* where he is talking about the relationship existing between words, concepts, and things. Words are referred to things through the mediation of concepts. Insofar, then, as something can be understood by us, it can be signified and named by us. Now, God cannot be known in this life according to His essence. But some say that He

[30]"Omnis ille conceptus est quidditativus respectu alicujus quod primo supponit per ipsam quidditatem et non pro aliquo alio subjecto denominato ab illa quidditale. 'Deus est sapientia,' supponit sapientia pro ipsa Deitate, quae non est subjectum" (*I Sent.*, 3, 3).

[31]*Summa contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 4.

[32]*ST*, q. 13, a. 3; q. 12.

[33]*III Sent.*, 9, R.

can be known from creatures insofar as He is their cause, has more perfection than they have, and is without their imperfection.[33] And so God can be known and named from creatures and by creatures. This is a real knowledge, and yet the names signifying God do not express the divine essence as it is in itself. Ockham fails to see where there is any real knowledge involved. In fact, he goes on to say that the whole process does not tell us anything at all. For we might just as well say that God is an angel, since He is the cause of an angel, more perfect than an angel, and not an angel. It is enough to say that we can impose names on God because we can form a concept of Him which can be applied only to Him and that this concept is, therefore, distinct from all other concepts. Where this is possible, a name can be found to signify that particular concept.

To this extent, then, can the human intellect go in its attempt to know God. We are speaking here of the intellect unaided by faith and grace. In that higher order man can know with certainty the many things that God has revealed about Himself. But in the realm of reason and philosophical speculation the knowledge that the human mind can assemble of the divinity is precious little. Philosophically speaking Ockham could grant no more. He had taken his stand on univocity and the cognition of the singular. Having thus limited knowledge of the real order to what was given in actual experience, he could come to no demonstratively certain conclusions which went beyond that order. He can hardly be called a skeptic, since he held as certain many of the conclusions he claimed were undemonstrable. But certainly the seeds of a philosophical agnosticism are there. They would thrive and come to full flower during the centuries which followed.

This becomes increasingly apparent when Ockham deals with the existence of suprasensible realities. All knowledge of existence is had by intuition; and intuition is limited to concrete, singular, existing sensibles. For Ockham abstraction means a precision from existence. Hence all knowledge of anything which is not a sensible existent is necessarily abstract knowledge. As a result, a division is set up between that which is purely intelligible and that which is sensibly existing. The farther, therefore, that one progresses into the realm of the purely intelligible, the farther one gets away from existence.

And since these intelligibles can never be verified in the world of experience, they can never be intuited. Ultimately this means that their existential reality can never be verified. Hence the certitude of many conclusions in metaphysics and natural theology is a certitude more properly derived from faith than from reason.

And here, in a sense, is the paradox of William of Ockham. He had started out to restore to reality the unity which he was sure Scotus had destroyed. And in that he succeeded. In his system there is no room for anything resembling a Platonic realism. The existing individual is one and only one, and everything that Ockham wrote was aimed at substantiating that basic conviction. And yet he went too far. Like every truth that is pushed to excess, this one, too, ceased to be a truth. In his complete individualization of all that was real and in his refusal to admit that reality was more than numerically complex, Ockham cut himself off once and for all from Him who is truly one. So interested was he in having the intellect attain the existing and material and individual singular that he made it impossible for the intellect to attain the truths that lay behind every existing singular.

Behind him there formed a long line of others who would make the division between the sensible and the intelligible still more radical and still more complete. God would be exiled farther and farther from the world He had created—if He really had created it. And the world would find it an ever more difficult task to rise to an understanding and a knowledge of the God from whom it had come.

THE ANALOGY OF PROPORTION ACCORDING TO THE METAPHYSICS OF ST. THOMAS

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There is a strong tradition among Thomists, dating back to Cajetan, that the analogy of proportion is not adequate for the needs of metaphysics. There are reassurances, however, that this analogy will find its rightful place in the metaphysics of St. Thomas—precisely because there is where St. Thomas placed it. Limitations associated with the analogy of proper proportionality and the necessity of the analogy of proportion for metaphysics are periodically proposed by Father Charles A. Hart.[1] And Father George P. Klubertanz, S.J., gives due acknowledgment to the metaphysical analogy of proportion in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Being.*[2]

Certainly, the argument for the nonadmissibility of the analogy of proportion in metaphysics has strong support in the writings of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. Perhaps one of the great pitfalls in the study of this analogy is centered around the apparently contradictory arguments of St. Thomas in the *De Veritate* and in the *Summa Theologiae*. In the former work, the Angelic Doctor maintains that "nothing can be predicated analogously of God and creatures according to this type of analogy." [3] In the *Summa Theologiae*, on the other hand, he is just as insistent on the analogy of proportion as he formerly was in favor of the analogy of proper proportionality: "It must be said that names are predicated of God and creatures in an analogous sense; that is, according to proportion." [4]

Those who reject the analogy of proportion point out the contradiction, to be sure, but extenuate it on the grounds that analogy is difficult in St. Thomas and that passages have to be culled with discrimination. However, these apparently contradictory positions of St. Thomas can be explained according to the context in which they appear; and if one were to select texts from St. Thomas with

"discrimination," one could not do much better than choose them from his maturer work, the *Summa Theologiae.*

The purpose of this article, then, is to show how there is more to the analogy of proportion in the *Summa* than is usually represented in one Article. But we must first account for the insistence on the part of certain Thomists in maintaining that the analogy of proper proportionality is the only truly metaphysical form of analogy.

Cajetan's Rejection of the Metaphysical Analogy of Proportion

Cajetan undoubtedly enjoys the most exalted position among the commentators of St. Thomas in respect to analogy; and his treatise, *De Nominum Analogia* is often referred to as the classical work on analogy. To Cajetan we owe much of our insight into the nature of the analogy of proper proportionality, particularly in reference to his delineation of the perfection proper to each analogate. This made for clarity in the modern development of the existential character of the very principles of being. It is the analogy which enables the intellect to arrive at an understanding of metaphysical being. It is the analogy which is necessary to have an understanding of act and potency, both in respect to matter and form in mobile being and in respect to essence and existence of every being by participation. It is the analogy which is necessary for an understanding of the unity of metaphysical being. However, we must admit that there are limitations to the analogy of proper proportionality if we consider the infinite distance between finite and infinite being. Because there are limitations to the analogy of proper proportionality, are these limitations to be imposed on metaphysics itself? Another relevant question can be raised: Are there to be no advances in the study of metaphysical analogy other than that made by Cajetan?

[1]*Unpublished Lectures* (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America, 1952-54).

[2]*Introduction to the Philosophy of Being* (rev. ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955).

[3]*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11.

[4]*ST*, I, q. 13, a. 15.

[5]*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1.

[6]"Vocatur quoque a Sancto Thoma in I Sent., dist. 19, ubi supra, *analogia secundum esse et secundum intentionem;* eo quod analogata ista, nec in ratione communis nominis, nec in esse illius rationis parificantur, et tamen tam in ratione illius nominis, quam in esse eisdem, proportionaliter conveniunt. Sed quoniam, ut dictum est, obscura et necessaria valde res haec est, accurate distincteque dilucidanda est per plura capitula" (*De Nominum Analogia*, ed. Zammit, O.P.-Hering, O.P. [Rome: Angelicum Press, 1952], p. 30).

[7]Cf. *ibid.*, Cap. II.

Cajetan's rejection of the metaphysical analogy of proportion has placed an undue restriction on the intelligibility of metaphysical being, particularly as to a more penetrating understanding of the transcendentals in relation to unparticipated and participated being. Moreover, in his zeal to uphold the metaphysical priority of the analogy of proper porportionality, Cajetan also places an obstacle to its very intelligibility. As a model for many Thomists after him, he bases his entire treatise of the analogy of proper proportionality on the familiar text from St. Thomas's *Commentary on the First Book of Sentences*, the analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse*.[5] It is an obstacle because St. Thomas neither specifies that this is an analogy of proper proportionality—he merely calls it metaphysical analogy—nor does he give an example which could be readily resolved into an analogy of proper proportionality. He mentions only being as it is predicated of substance and accident—only three terms and not the four required for proper proportionality. Cajetan himself admits that this is a difficult problem.

> This analogy is called by St. Thomas in the *First Book of Sentences*, distinction 19 [cited above], the *analogy according to "to be" and according to intention*; because the analogates are neither represented equally in the intelligibility of a common name nor in the "to be" of that intelligibility. Nevertheless, just as they agree proportionally in the intelligibility of its name, so also in its "to be." But since, as it has been mentioned, this matter is obscure and very necessary, it should be elucidated accurately and distinctly through several chapters.[6]

The obscurity is compounded by the fact that the example which St. Thomas gives for metaphysical analogy (*secundum intentionem et secundum esse*) has all the earmarks of the analogy of proportion or attribution. But this interpretation could not fit into the framework of Cajetan's theory of analogy. He had dismissed the analogy of proportion from any metaphysical consideration on the grounds that in such an analogy a formal perfection is intrinsic to only one analogate and that this perfection is predicated of other analogates only by way of extrinsic denomination.[7] In the light of this interpretation of the analogy of porportion, those who follow Cajetan in

rejecting the metaphysical analogy of proportion act in a perfectly logical manner. Only, they must admit that this is Cajetan's interpretation of the analogy of proportion and not St. Thomas's.

We agree with Cajetan's interpretation of the analogy *secundum intentionem et non secundum esse.* Here we have an example of the analogy of proportion, to be sure, in which the formal perfection is intrinsic to the primary analogate and extrinsic to the secondary analogates—the analogy of proportion by extrinsic denomination or logical analogy. However, we shall show how St. Thomas by no means confines his analogy of proportion to such extrinsic denomination, whereas Cajetan apparently does. We shall see how even Cajetan was forced to admit an analogy of proportion by intrinsic denomination. However, because he does confine his interpretation of the analogy of proportion to logical analogy, he maintains that the analogy of proper proportionality excels in dignity.

> This analogy surpasses the aforementioned others in dignity and in name. In dignity, because this analogy is made according to the genus of inherent formality—because it predicates those things which inhere in singulars. Whereas, the other analogy is made according to extrinsic denomination.[8]

Before comparing the analogy of proportion in the writings of St. Thomas to the specifications of this analogy by Cajetan, it would be well to have at least a little understanding of the historical background which prompted Cajetan to champion the analogy of proper proportionality.

Cajetan made definite contributions in the development of this analogy. And Father Pedro Descoqs, S.J., stretches a point when he maintains that the analogy of proper proportionality owes its impor-

[8]"Praeponitur autem analogia haec caeteris antedictis dignitate et nomine. Dignitate quidem, quia haec fit secundum genus causae formalis inhaerentis: quoniam praedicat ea, quae singulis inhaerent. Altera vero secundum extrinsecam denominationem fit" (*ibid.*, Chap. III).

[9]*Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925), I, 227.

[10]"Nec fuit forte ab Aristotelis tempore tam periculosus casus iste, sicut modo apud nos est; quoniam blasphemare fere videtur, qui metaphysicales terminos analogos dicens, secundum proportionalitatem communes exponit" (*De Nominum*, Chap. III).

[11]"Difficultates de analogia, quae satis metaphysicae sunt, ita copiose et subtiliter a Caietano disputatae sunt in opus. *de Analogia nominum*, ut nobis locum non reliquerit quidam aliud excogitandi" (*Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus*, ed. Beato Reiser, O.S.B [Turin: Marietti, 1930], I, 481).

tance to Cajetan.[9] It is safe to say that the necessity of the analogy of proper proportionality in metaphysics is universally admitted by Thomists. However, Cajetan has influenced many authors in the rejection of the analogy of proportion for any serious metaphysical consideration. He had succeeded in swaying future Thomists to an opposite extreme of his own times—an era which had rejected the analogy of proper proportionality, as he himself declares.

> The situation has perhaps never been so dangerous since the time of Aristotle as it is among us; since it appears almost blasphemous if one, saying the metaphysical terms are analogous, explains them as common according to proportionality.[10]

Cajetan reacted so strongly against the current trend that it is conceivable he did not foresee the movement he would start in an entirely opposite direction. His treatise was so masterfully written that John of St. Thomas bows completely to it: "The difficulties concerning analogy, which are more metaphysical, have been argued so thoroughly and subtly by Cajetan in the opusculum *On the Analogy of Names* that no room is left for us to find out anything further." [11] We say that it is quite conceivable that Cajetan did not, or could not, foresee the opposite trend in metaphysical analogy caused by his treatise because he himself realized that not every form of analogy of proportion is an analogy of extrinsic denomination—and his statement to this effect is overlooked by his most ardent followers.

An Overlooked Text of Cajetan's on the Analogy of Proportion

The analogy of attribution or proportion in which the analogon is extrinsic to the secondary analogates is not the only form of analogy of proportion which Cajetan recognized. He actually cautions his readers to make a distinction between this analogy of proportion and the analogy of proportion wherein the analogon is not extrinsic to the secondary analogates:

> It should be carefully observed that this first condition of such a mode of analogy, namely, that it is not according to the genus of an inhering formal cause, but always according to

something extrinsic, should be formally and not materially understood. That is, it should not be understood in the sense that every name which is analogous by attribution is so common to the analogates that it pertains formally only to the first analogate and to the other analogates by extrinsic denomination, just as it happens in the case of health and medicine; for that universal [law of analogy of attribution or proportion] is false, as it is evident concerning being and good.[12]

Unfortunately, Cajetan is too preoccupied with making an overt case for the analogy of proper proportionality to go further into the problem. He continues by confining his delineation of the analogy of proportion to logical analogy.

> But it should be understood here that every name analogous by attribution as such, or insofar as it is so analogous, is common to the analogates in such a manner that it pertains formally to the primary analogate, but by extrinsic denomination to the other analogates.[13]

Had he elaborated on the analogy concerning *being* and *good* (as when good is predicated of God and man), many pitfalls in the study of analogy would have been avoided. And it is unfortunate that so

[12]"Sed diligenter advertendum est, quod haec huiusmodi analogiae conditio, scilicet, quod non sit secundum genus causae formalis inhaerentis, sed semper secundum aliquid extrinsecum, est formaliter intelligenda et non materialiter: id est non est intelligendum per hoc, quod omne nomen quod est analogum per attributionem, sit commune analogatis sic, quod primo tantum conveniat formaliter, caeteris autem extrinseca denominatione, ut de sano et medicinali accidit; ista enim universalis est falsa, ut patet de ente et bono" (*De Nominum*, Cap. II).

[13]"Sed est ex hoc intelligendum, quod omne nomen analogum per attributionem ut sic, vel in quantum sic analogum, commune est analogatis sic, quod primo convenit formaliter, reliquis autem extrinseca denominatione" (*ibid.*).

[14]"Nunc breviter dicitur ex. D. Tho. in 1 d. 19, 2, 5, art. 2, ad 1, inter analoga attributionis quaedam esse, quae significant formam, quae intrinsece tantum est in principali analogato, in aliis vero solum per habitudinem, vel denominationem extrinsecam: ut sanum et similia, et his repugnat unitas conceptus formalis: quia analogata non habent inter se propriam similitudinem et convenientiam. Alia vero esse, quae significant formam seu naturam intrinsece inventam in omnibus analogatis: et huiusmodi est ens, ut infra videbimus, nam accidentia non sunt entia per extrinsecam denominationem, sed per intrinsecam naturam seu rationem entis, quam participant: et in huiusmodi analogis non est inconveniens dari unum conceptum formale simpliciter et absolute in se unum re et ratione formali adaequata: in quo autem eius analogia consistat, infra explicabitur" (*Metaphysicarum Disputationum* [Paris: Moreau, 1619], p. 49).

[15]*ST*, I, q. 13, aa. 3-6.

[16]*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11.

many of the modern Thomists should ignore the distinction between the two types of analogy of attribution which Cajetan sets forth. Then again, it was Suarez who championed the analogy of intrinsic attribution,[14] and that fact immediately made this analogy suspect, as though it were impossible for the *Doctor Eximius* to be in accord on any single theory with the *Doctor Universalis.*

Actually, Cajetan's distinction between these two analogies of attribution is too cryptically drawn. Not too much can be gathered from what he says to elaborate on it, unless, of course, we go directly to St. Thomas. If good is predicated of God and man, good is found in the primary analogate according to the fullness of perfection. But we cannot predicate good of man according to extrinsic denomination; as that would be the same as saying that good is extrinsic to man. Then, again, we cannot say that man formally participates in the goodness of God, as that would be sheer pantheism. It would be permissible to speculate on the reasons why Cajetan did not elaborate on the metaphysical species of analogy of attribution—he did everything he could to make a case for the analogy of proper proportionality in an age which was doing all it could to make a case for the analogy of attribution. Suffice it to say that it is evident that Cajetan did not wish to eliminate the analogy of proportion entirely from metaphysics. However, the solution to the problem is not to be found in Cajetan but in St. Thomas.

Metaphysical Analogy of Proportion according to St. Thomas

St. Thomas makes a clear-cut case for the metaphysical analogy of proportion in the *Summa Theologiae.*[15] His treatment of the analogy of proportion here is not merely an answer to an objection, but it is meticulously drawn. It would not do simply to compare his statements on analogy in the *De Veritate* [16] and in the *Summa,* and arrive at a snap judgment that perhaps we have conflicting statements. Both treatises must be seen in their entirety.

For analogy, a certain resemblance is required. Without resemblance we would have no basis for an analogical community, and we

would have pure equivocation.[17] In the *De Veritate*, St. Thomas shows how analogical community is possible in two ways:

> According to the first mode of agreement [namely, there is a certain agreement between things which have a proportion between each other, in that they have a determinate distance or some relationship to each other], we find something predicated analogously of two things when one has a relationship to the other, just as being is predicated of substance and accident from the relationship which substance and accident have; and health is predicated of urine and animal becauses urine has some relation to the health of an animal.
>
> Sometimes, however, something is predicated analogously in the second mode of agreement, as the term "sight" is predicated of bodily and intellectual vision, because sight is in the eye as understanding is in the mind.[18]

It should be noted here that St. Thomas says that being is predicated of substance and accident according to the same species of analogy that health is predicated of animal and urine; and he distinguishes this species of analogy from the analogy of proper proportionality. St. Thomas continues by ruling out the analogy of proportion in predicating names analogously of God and creatures:

> Therefore, because in these terms which are predicated analogously according to the first mode there should be some

[17]"Similiter etiam nec nos ex rebus creatis in cognitionem Dei pervenire possemus; nec nominum quae creaturis aptantur, unum magis de eo dicendum esset quam aliud; quia ex aequivocis non differt quodcumque nomen imponatur, ex quo nulla rei convenientia attenditur" (*ibid.*).

[18]". . . secundum modum primae convenientiae invenimus aliquid analogice dictum de duobus quorum unum ad alterum habitudinem habet; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente ex habitudine quam substantia et accidens habent; et sanum dicitur de urina et animali, ex eo quod urina habet aliquam similitudinem ad sanitatem animalis.

"Quandoque vero dicitur aliquid analogice secundo modo convenientiae; sicut nomen visus dicitur de visu corporali et intellectu, eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intellectus est in mente" (*ibid.*).

[19]"Quia ergo in his quae primo modo analogice dicuntur, oportet esse aliquam determinatam habitudinem inter ea quibus est aliquid per analogiam commune, impossibile est aliquid per hunc modum analogiae dici de Deo et creatura; quia nulla creatura habet talem habitudinem ad Deum per quam possit divina perfectio determinari" (*ibid.*).

[20]"Est enim quaedam convenientia inter ipsa quorum est ad invicem proportio, eo quod habent determinatam distantiam vel aliam habitudinem ad invicem" (*ibid.*).

[21]*ST*, I, q. 13, a. 3 ad 1.

determinate relationship between those things which have something in common through analogy, it is impossible that something be predicated analogously of God and creature according to this mode of analogy because no creature has such a relationship to God through which the Divine perfection can be determinate.[19]

Here it should also be noted that St. Thomas does not favor the analogy of proper proportionality over the analogy of proportion in predicating names of God and creatures on the grounds that one is metaphysical analogy and the other is logical analogy. As an example of the analogy of proportion, he cites being as it is predicated of substance and accident. This example should be noted for future reference in comparing Cajetan's interpretation of the analogy *secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse* and the analogy *secundum intentionem et secundum esse*. In the *De Veritate*, St. Thomas restricted his consideration of the analogy of proportion to a certain relation which is determined according to a formal likeness: "There is a certain agreement between things which have a proportion between each other, in that they have a determinate distance or some relationship to each other." [20]

However, the requirements for the analogy of proportion were considerably modified in the *Summa Theologiae*. Herein, there is a more thorough treatment of terms in respect to their modes of signification.[21] His treatment of terms which signify perfections in an absolute sense—without any mode of participation—is of utmost importance to the metaphysician in respect to what limitations are to be imposed on the very object of metaphysics itself. In short, what is the mode of analogical intelligibility of a perfection considered absolutely in itself, without any mode of participation being part of its signification? Concerning two modes of signifying perfection, one which is participated in an imperfect way and the other which signifies no participation whatsoever, St. Thomas says:

> Certain terms signify perfections of this manner as proceeding from God to creatures in such a way that the very imperfect mode by which the divine perfection is participated by a creature is included in the very signification of the term, just as stone signifies some material being; and in this manner terms cannot be

attributed to God except metaphorically. However, certain names signify the perfections themselves in an absolute manner, without any mode of participation included in their signification, as *being*, *good*, *living*, and the like; and such terms are properly predicated of God.[22]

Here we note a different approach to the problem of predicating names. He now considers the function of terms which signify no imperfection or participation and, hence, no determined relation. In the very first article of the thirteenth question, he considers how words are signs of ideas and how "we know God from creatures as their cause and also by way of excellence and remotion." We do not consider God as the cause of perfection alone, but we must also understand the perfection as pre-existing in God, as he explains in the following article: "Hence, it does not follow that God is good because He causes goodness; but, rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good." Here he considers how terms are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of representing Him perfectly. In the third article, he develops the same theme. He shows how our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures.

[22]"Quaedam nomina significant huiusmodi perfectiones a Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso nominis significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid materialiter ens : et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut *ens*, *bonum*, *vivens*, et huiusmodi : et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo" (*ibid.*).

[23]"Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, id est proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus: vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones" (*ibid.*, a. 5).

[24]"Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut *ens*, *bonum*, *vivens*, et huiusmodi: et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo" (*ibid.*, a. 3 ad 1).

[25]"Cum enim dicitur Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius praeexistunt" (*ibid.*, a. 6).

And then he takes up the aforementioned distinction of two modes of signifying perfection, the signification of unparticipated perfection and the signification of participated perfection.

St. Thomas's whole approach to the problem is designed to show how the fullness of perfection is intrinsic to the primary analogate, unparticipated being, and is participated in by secondary analogates, participated being. No determined relation can be inferred. Thus, in the following article, he maintains how terms are not applied to God and creatures synonymously; and in the fifth article, he synthesizes the preceding four articles to show how terms are predicated of God and creatures according to analogy of proportion.

> Therefore, it must be maintained that such terms are predicated of God and creatures according to analogy; that is, proportion. This can take place in terms according to the following two ways: either because many have a proportion to one, as health is predicated of medicine and urine, insofar as each has an order and proportion to the health of the animal, of which the latter is a certain sign, the former its cause; or from the fact that one has a proportion to another, just as health is predicated of medicine and animal insofar as medicine is the cause of the health which is in the animal. And in this manner some things are predicated of God and creatures analogically, and not purely equivocally, nor univocally. For we can name God only from creatures, as it has been said above. And so, whatever is predicated of God and creatures is predicated according as there is some order of the creature to God, as to a principle and cause in which all perfections of things pre-exist excellently.[23]

Now if we consider all five articles according to a certain unity, we can readily infer that St. Thomas is speaking of an analogy of participation, in which the fullness of perfection pre-exists in unparticipated being.[24] He even brings out the same theme in the next article: "For the words 'God is good' or 'wise' signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way." [25]

It would be sheer nonsense to say that *good* is predicated of God and creatures according to an analogy of extrinsic denomination—for

that would no longer make *good* convertible with *being*. In effect, it would maintain *good* to be extrinsic to the secondary analogates, participated *being*. That is why Cajetan himself admitted that not every form of analogy of proportion is an analogy of extrinsic denomination.

A Comparison Between St. Thomas and Cajetan on the Analogy of Proportion

An examination of the full text from St. Thomas's *Commentary on the First Book of Sentences* will not only show how metaphysical analogy differs from logical analogy and the so-called analogy of "inequality," but it will also bring out the metaphysical analogy of proportion.

> Something is predicated according to analogy in three ways: either according to intention only and not according to the act of existing; and this is when one intention is referred to several things by priority and posteriority, but however, it does not have actual existence except in one of them. Thus, the intention of health is applied to animal, to urine, and to diet in various ways, according to priority and posteriority, though not according to a diverse act of "to be," because the "to be" of health is only in the animal.

[26]"Aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius, quae tamen non habet esse nisi in uno; sicut intentio sanitatis refertur ad animal, urinam et dietam diversimode, secundum prius et posterius; non tamen secundum diversum esse, quia esse sanitatis non est nisi in animali. Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde Logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit, hoc nomen, corpus, de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari: sed esse hujus naturae non est ejusdem rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, qui considerant res secundum suum esse, nec hoc nomen, corpus, nec aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus, ut patet X Met., text. 5, ex Philosopho et Commentatore. Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentione communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habeat aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum rationem majoris vel minoris perfectionis" (*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1).

[27]"Et in 1, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1, analoga secundum esse et intentionem, quae sunt analoga proportionalitatis, dicit in analogatis debere intrinsece reperiri" (*Cursus Philosophicus*, Log. II, 13, 4).

Or something is predicated analogously according to "to be" and not according to intention; and this happens when many things are considered equal in some common concept, but that which is predicated in common does not have a "to be" of the same nature in all things of which it is predicated, as all bodies are considered equal in the intention of corporeity. Thus the logician, who considers intentions only, says that the term "body" is predicated univocally of all bodies, and yet corporeity does not exist in corruptible and in incorruptible bodies in the same mode. Hence, for the metaphysician and the philosopher of nature who consider things in their actual being, neither the term "body" nor any other term is said univocally of corruptible and incorruptible things, as is clear from what the Philosopher and the Commentator say.

Finally, something is predicated analogously according to "to be" and according to intention; and according to this mode of analogy, nothing is considered equal either according to a common intention or the act of "to be," just as being is said of substance and accident; and in such cases, the common nature should have some existence in each of those things of which it is predicated, but differing according to the understanding of greater or lesser perfection.[26]

If the example which St.Thomas cites for metaphysical analogy is interpreted according to the analogy of proper proportionality, it will be a venture which Cajetan admits, as we have seen, to be very obscure, and which John of St. Thomas says is very difficult. St. Thomas certainly does not say that the analogy according to "to be" and according to intention is an analogy of proper proportionality. He merely states that it is metaphysical analogy. It is Cajetan who characterizes this analogy as the analogy of proper proportionality. And John of St. Thomas follows Cajetan so closely that one is apt to get the impression that St. Thomas actually says it is such an analogy: "In the First Book of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1, he says that the analogues according to 'to be' and according to intention, which are analogues of proportionality, should be intrinsically found in the analogates." [27] Certainly, there is no ques-

tion concerning the fact that the analogues according to "to be" and according to intention must exist intrinsically in the analogates. However, the clause, "which are analogues of proportionality," is merely a parenthetical one offered by John of St. Thomas; and it does not exist in the text of St. Thomas himself.

The obscurity which Cajetan refers to, stems from the fact that St. Thomas does not give an example of the analogy according to "to be" and according to intention in terms of the analogy of proper proportionality. He actually gives an example of proportion or attribution, "just as being is said of substance and accidents." If we recall, this is the same example which he gives in the *De Veritate*, wherein he explicitly calls this an analogy of proportion.

If we admit that the analogy of proper proportionality is virtually contained in the analogy of proportion,[28] and vice versa, then Cajetan is perfectly justified in saying that this is an analogy of proper proportionality—but virtually or potentially should be included. Whereas if the text in question is explained according to what is actually contained therein, a lot of needless obscurity is eliminated.

St. Thomas is not distinguishing between the analogy of proportion and the analogy of proper proportionality, but between logical analogy, the so-called analogy of "inequality," and metaphysical analogy: (1) analogy according to intention only and not according to "to be"—health as predicated of animal, diet, and so on; (2) analogy according to "to be" only and not according to intention—body as predicated of corruptible and incorruptible things; and (3) analogy according to "to be" and according to intention—being as predicated of substance and accidents.

The distinction between logical analogy and metaphysical analogy is one in which the formal perfection is not intrinsic to the secondary analogates in the former analogy; and in the latter there is a participation of the primary analogate's ontological perfection in all secondary analogates. In the same respect, good is ontologically realized in God and in creatures—analogically according to intention and according to "to be." Good, signifying the fullness of perfection, is one with God's existence and is participated in every finite being. Any attempt to postulate that this is an analogy of proper propor-

[28]Cf. "Non dari utramque analogiam formaliter, sed alteram virtualiter" (*ibid.*). Cf.: "Analogia entis inter Deum et creaturas, substantiam et accidens, est analogia proportionalitatis; est etiam proportionis, non formaliter, sed virtualiter" (Eduardo Hugon, O.P., *Metaphysica* [Paris: Lethielleux, 1936], p. 259).

tionality is simply not explicit. That the analogy of proper proportionality is virtually contained in the example which St. Thomas gives, "being as predicated of substance and accidents," is not the issue at hand. When Cajetan based his treatise of analogy of proper proportionally on this text, he had to admit it was somewhat obscure. The answer to this problem is found in a mere examination of the examples which St. Thomas cites; and his example of metaphysical analogy defies interpretation according to the analogy of proper proportionality. The examples which St. Thomas gives are all of proportions: (1) health as predicated of body, diet, urine; (2) body as predicated of incorruptible and corruptible things; and (3) being as predicated of substance and accidents.

That St. Thomas does not explicitly state the analogy according to intention and according to "to be" is an analogy of proper proportionality is obvious; that he does not use an example of the analogy of proper proportionality is equally obvious; and finally, that St. Thomas does not intend to imply that such an analogy is one of proper proportionality can be argued from the internal evidence of his *Commentary on the First Book of Sentences.* Whenever he treats of analogy in this work (as far as the author could determine), he never cites an example of the analogy of proper proportionality.

It is only when the examples that St. Thomas gives are taken for their face value as analogies of proportion that the analogy "according to intention and according to 'to be'" can be seen to apply also to the metaphysical analogy of proper proportionality. All that remains is to show that there is an ontological reality in each of the four analogates.

With the analogy of proportion presented in its true metaphysical light, we can see its priority over the analogy of proper proportionality in treating participated and unparticipated being. In interpretating metaphysical analogy of proportion according to the implications in the *Summa Theologiae,* we can say that in the metaphysical analogy of proportion the perfection is found in its fullness in the primary analogate and is participated in all the secondary analogates. In participation, we can see the limitations of the metaphysical analogy of proper proportionality and the necessity (and priority) of the metaphysical analogy of proportion.

Tenth Annual Meeting of the Missouri State Philosophical Association

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The Missouri State Philosophical Association met for the tenth time at Washington University in Saint Louis on Friday and Saturday, October 18 and 19.

The program followed the pattern which has become traditional in the association: three independent, unrelated papers on Friday afternoon, the presidential address following the association dinner on Friday evening; and a panel discussion, or symposium, consisting of three papers around a central theme on Saturday morning.

The first paper on Friday was a careful presentation of Hume's description of causality by Solomon Levy (Kansas City University). Limitations of time prevented more than a brief statement of the speaker's critique in terms of Hume's neglect of relevant causal factors. The second paper, by John A. Gates (Westminster College), illustrated Kierkegaard's espousal of subjectivity by means of significant events in Kierkegaard's personal life and crucial passages from the text. The third paper was a precise, quasi-phenomenological description of some realistic implications in an instance of direct perception, by W. Donald Oliver (Missouri University).

At the association dinner, the retiring president, Reverend Linus J. Thro, S.J., considered the question of the inevitability of philosophical presuppositions, pointing to the presuppositions implicit and, to a considerable extent, unexamined in several major historical positions. He went on to suggest the possibility that reality may afford direct metaphysical insights which, while immediately given, are nevertheless subject to critical review and analytic justification within such metaphysics. The ensuing questions and discussion were searching and vigorous.

In the panel discussion on Saturday morning on recent trends in existentialism, James Snedden (Washington University) stressed the communication difficulties brought about by the existentialists' unorthodox use of language and offered some categories useful for the study of the language of existentialism. Irving Levitas (Kansas City University) attempted to delineate the existential attitudes of Martin Buber in the framework of his concern for the function of Judaism in modern society. Thomas Langan (Saint Louis University) attempted to show, in the texts themselves, Martin Heideggers's own resolutions of three misgivings Heidegger proposes against the existentialist's basic position.

(To be continued on p. 116.)

GABRIEL MARCEL'S NOTION OF PERSONAL COMMUNICATION

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It is a fact that man is lonely and that loneliness can be alleviated by personal communication. The philosopher, Gabriel Marcel, sees that loneliness is a problem and that personal communication can be a solution for this problem. In his eyes the abstract thinking of idealism and the arithmetical approach towards man of collectivization are two factors that are responsible for the ontological dissolution of the human person and the loneliness of man. Marcel notes that one of the evils of this age of mechanization is that individuals are linked together as though they were parts of a machine. There is collectivization instead of communication, and this produces a collection of objects rather than a community of human beings. Men are treated as objects collected together to perform a certain task as a part of a larger and vastly more important machine, while they should be treated as people in a community capable of personal communication.

Man has lost the dignity which belongs to him as a human person, a creature formed in the image of his Creator. Reality is centered in man; it reflects his errors; and these errors cannot be corrected unless man is restored to his rightful position. Collectivization, mechanization, and technocracy treat man as an individual object set apart and cut off from other objects, and because of this man is lonely. The abstract thinking of idealism and collectivization have threatened to submerge the irreplaceable human personality, and so existential thinkers of modern Europe have answered the threat by reasserting man. The individual has been forced to a "resolute and radical self affirmation." [1]

The existentialistic philosophers are individualistic, though in different ways. Both Marcel and Sartre are interested in the individual person and his experiences, but Marcel's outlook is quite different from that of Sartre. In the Christian existentialism of Gabriel Marcel the individual can be "open" [2] to other individuals and is able to

communicate with them and with God, whereas in the atheistic existentialism of Sartre the individual is a closed-off unit completely alone and incapable of any sort of successful communication. As Sartre sees it, the individual is for himself all that is, while for Marcel the individual goes out from himself by communicating with other people and with God. The individualism that is characteristic of existentialism differs in the philosophies of Christian and atheistic existentialists. For the Christian the beginning and end of an individual human personality is found in God, while for the atheistic existentialist it is found in the individual himself.

Both Christian and atheistic existentialists are concerned with and analyze the loneliness or self-enclosedness of man, but while Sartre emphasizes the loneliness Marcel sees that man can be freed from loneliness by communication and communion. The existential insularity of man's personality is not an insoluble or hopeless problem. It is true that as God has created man each personality is unique, and because it is unique it is incommunicable. The incommunicability of personality tends to make man lonely; but even though man cannot communicate his unique personality, he is still capable of personal communication, and it is communication that will relieve the inevitable loneliness of man.

Man is able to communicate with others; that is, with God, other

[1]Kurt F. Reinhardt, *The Existentialist Revolt* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952). p. 14.

[2]Marcel says that when Sartre calls giving a means of enslaving he is revealing an inability to grasp "what is meant by *we*, or of what governs this reality. That is precisely our capacity to open ourselves to others" (Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existence* [London, 1948], p. 74).

[3]"Even if I pray alone in my room, we can and should maintain that I am uniting myself by or in this prayer to a community which does not belong exclusively, or even primarily, to the visible world" (Marcel, *Mystery of Being* [Chicago: Regnery, 1951], II, 95).

[4]"From the religious standpoint God appears as the sole mediator who can permit me to be really 'with' the person I am praying for. It is only by positing the necessity of that mediator that we can dissipate the dangers of confusion between the metaphysical order and the order that is strictly religious" (Marcel, *Metaphysical Journal* [Chicago: Regnery, 1952], pp. 170-71).

[5]*Mystery of Being*, II, 108.

[6]Reinhardt, p. 208.

[7]Marcel, *Metaphysical Journal*, p. 158.

[8]"However something happens here which is of decisive importance: it is that this self of mine which is a prisoner cannot declare in all sincerity that it is I. I have an awareness of not being reducible to this captive self. The self of love and prayer proclaims itself as something distinct, even though between the self of love and prayer and the captive self there is something more than a mere cohabitation. And it is only this self of love and prayer that can become an eschatological consciousness. . . . That task that does belong to it is that of preparation for this event" (Marcel, *Men Against Humanity* [London, 1952], p. 170).

mortal men, and with self. We communicate with God as other, the Absolute Other, and we can communicate with self insofar as it is the self considered as other with which we communicate. All communication is with someone other than the self as self.

The consideration of communication might well begin with the highest form of communication, communication with God, which is seen in prayer, love, fidelity, and hope. For Marcel it is possible to establish a real communication with the personal, transcendent knowable God. I can unite myself *with*[3] God and the person for whom I am praying through prayer. In prayer I form a community with others—with God and with other men through the mediation of God.[4] Faith, hope, and charity or intersubjectivity[5] are all related to one another and so cannot be considered apart from one another. Nor can these be considered apart from the human person who is the subject of communication, and God, his Creator, without whom the most real communication is impossible.

Faith creates the Christian quality of the believer's personality, and this personality is intersubjective. In the act of faith the "individual constitutes himself as a person by affirming the infinite personality of God."[6] Faith bears on the infinite as does love. Any participation in divine life is participation in the infinite. Even human love bears on the infinite, or as Marcel puts it ". . . to love someone truly is to love him in God."[7] Man tends towards the infinite by hope; he expresses hope in that which cannot come from himself or from his situation. He expresses hope in God, thereby confirming his dependence. There is need to transcend the self and communicate with the divine by faith, hope, and love.

It is the self of love and prayer that participates in God.[8] The self of love and prayer transcends the captive self and reaches out towards the divine. The self of love and prayer is the intersubjective self. It seeks God and is concerned with the destiny of the individual. Prayer, faith, hope, and love extend towards others and are ways in which the intersubjective self can communicate with God. The most successful sort of communal life requires communication with the divine.

Communication with the Absolute Other is the most important and highest form of communication, but of more immediate concern is communication with other men and with self. There are two

types of communication, dialectical communication, using signs and symbols as its means; and there is revelation, which does not require the mediation of signs and symbols.[9] Personal communication takes place between minds. My mind is that which communicates, and it communicates with itself and with other minds. The existence of a thing precedes communication; that is, a thing must exist before it can be communicated. That which is communicated is knowledge and love.

There are certain hindrances to personal communication, and in his principal works Marcel mentions, explicitly, five of these.[10] Pride is a barrier to communication because the proud man draws his strength from himself, thereby cutting himself off from a kind of communion with other men. Drawing away from God hinders communication because man thereby separates himself from the universal communion. Self-centeredness hinders communication because self-centered people, even while communicating, are interested in themselves and the agreement of their views with others rather than in the truth that is being communicated. Tension between being and having presents a problem in the sense that ". . . having can serve as a high wall against other people and as a barrier to personal communication."[11] And finally language is a danger to communication in that an illumination that is to be communicated must become language, and when it is put into a sentence it runs the risk of being repeated mechanically and losing the original meaning. These five—pride, self-centeredness, drawing away from God, "having" (in a particular sense), and language—are the barriers to communication that Marcel has mentioned explicitly in his major works.

[9]Marcel, *Metaphysical Journal*, p. 189. Besides dialectical communication Marcel holds that it is possible "to conceive of a mode of communication which is not made by means of questions and answers and hence is not accomplished by means of signs. As a communication of this kind has no reference of any cypher or any code, it must necessarily have the appearance of being fortuitous, I would be tempted to give this kind of communication the name of revelation" (*ibid.*, p. 138).

[10]Marcel, *Philosophy of Existence*, p. 20; *Homo Viator* (Chicago, 1951), p. 89; *Mystery of Being*, I, 74, 53.

[11]James Collins, *The Existentialists* (Chicago: Regnery, 1952), p. 141.

[12]Marcel, *Homo Viator*, p. 66.

[13]"For the one I am a presence; for the other I am an object. Presence involves a reciprocity which is excluded from any relation of subject to object or of subject to subject-object" (Marcel, *Philosophy of Existence*, p. 26).

[14]*Ibid.*

[15]*Ibid.*

[16]"To give is to appropriate by means of destroying and to use this act of destruction as a means of destroying others" (Jean Paul Sartre, *L'Etre et le néant*, p. 685).

Within communication it is fitting to consider the following notions: presence, giving and receiving, "openness," what is meant by the we-subject, and what is meant by the preposition *with*.

Presence is a communication of self to another person, a giving of self to another. And from the other side of the relationship I can say that a being is not really a being for me unless it is present to me; that is, unless it is a presence. What is present to me is not a mere object; presence goes beyond any subject-object relationships. I do not gain objective knowledge of a person who is present to me. I am in communion with that person, and if the communion is the communion of love then the more love approaches charity the more it is filled with ". . . an unconditioned quality which is the very sign of presence."[12] One who is present to me makes room for me in himself; he gives himself to me with the whole of his being. There is reciprocity[13] in the relationship wherein people are present to each other. "Presence is something which reveals itself immediately and unmistakably in a look, a smile, an intonation, or a handshake."[14] The person who is present to me or at my disposal "is capable of being with me with the whole of himself when I am in need; while the one who is not at my disposal seems merely to offer me a temporary loan raised on his resources."[15]

Very closely allied to the notion of presence is that of giving and receiving. Just as presence involves the self, so giving and receiving are primarily concerned with the self rather than the material object that is given. Giving and receiving involve the self even if it only be that whatever I give must be mine before I give it. Giving and receiving are ways of communicating self to others. Receptivity can be communication and exchange; it involves more than one person because when a gift is given, it is given to someone. If receptivity is to be genuine communication there must be some response on the part of the one who receives, and this response is the sign of openness. The receiver makes himself open to receive the gift. Giving and receiving are looked upon differently by Sartre and by Marcel. Sartre neither understands the significance of receiving nor the nature of the gift. For Sartre giving is a form of appropriation and destruction.[16]

Openness is necessary for communication and especially for that

communication wherein intersubjectivity is involved, since intersubjectivity presupposes reciprocal openness. Man must make himself open to other men and to God. Another person can only be present to me insofar as I am open to him. When I am open to another person and present to him I help him to be present to me. Openness is very closely related to the we-subject in the sense that what is meant by *we* is ". . . precisely our capacity to open ourselves to others." [17]

In a sense *we* means that two people are together in that they are open or present to each other. *We* signifies community whether it be between me and God, me and another man, or between me and myself. The sharing of a common experience can establish a community between me and another, and in this way a transition is brought about from the *him* to the *us*.[18]

The notion of participation denotes communication and requires openness. According to Marcel there is participation between myself and my body as there is between myself and the world, others and God. I participate in the divine life, the infinite, and in the life of the person whom I love. The more I love someone the more I participate in his life. The preposition "with" also indicates communication. "The word 'with' only has meaning where unity is felt."[19] This is seen in prayer, which is uniting oneself with God, and in thinking about another person. When I think of another person I am "with" him. It is also connected with presence because when a person is present to me he is with me with the whole of himself.

Besides communication with others there is communication with self, which is really only an aspect of communication with others in that it is when we consider the self as other that we communicate with

[17]Marcel, *Philosophy of Existence*, p. 74.

[18]Marcel, *Metaphysical Journal*, p. 173.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 170.

[20]Marcel says "that the means by which we communicate with ourselves are not really different from the means by which we communicate with others" (*ibid.*, p. 176).

"Let us observe, moreover, that this danger is not only one which attends a communication from myself to another person, but that it also attends, if I may be allowed to put it in this way, a communication from me to myself" (*Mystery of Being*, I, 53).

Regarding the communication between consciousnesses Marcel says "that the conditions in which a consciousness can communicate with other consciousnesses are the same as conditions that permit it to communicate with itself" (*Metaphysical Journal*, p. 241).

[21]The translators of Marcel's works have translated *toi* as *thou*. *Thou*, in this context, is intended to be intimate or familiar. This use of *thou* is archaic, but it seems that the translators have used it for lack of an English equivalent for *toi*.

[22]Marcel, *Mystery of Being*, II, 154.

[23]*Ibid.*, I, 171.

it. The means, dangers, and conditions for communicating with others are the same for communicating with self, since we communicate with self as other.[20]

It is fitting to consider subjectivity and objectivity as they are related to communication in the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel because for Marcel real communication takes place between subjects rather than between objects. The subjects of personal communication are the *I* and the *thou*[21] rather than two impersonal objects. The *I-thou* relationship is necessary for successful personal communication and community life. Another person becomes a *thou* for me when I exist for him; in fact, if I think myself as existing for him he becomes a thou for me. It must be remembered that a person whom I love or a friend is not only a *thou*; he is a thou-for-me insofar as I love him; but before I love him or apart from the consideration of my love for him, he is an object, a him; and it is my love or friendship, my existence for him that makes him a thou for me.

> We must fully realize that this being whom I love is not only a *thou*; in the first place he is an object which comes within my view, and towards whom I can effect all the preparations whose possibility is included in my condition of physical agent. He is a *that*, and it is precisely to that extent that he is a thing; in so far, on the other hand, as he is a *thou*, he is freed from the nature of things, and nothing I can say about things can concern him, can concern the *thou*.[22]

The being I love can be considered merely as an object, as a mere thing, and in such a case my communication with the other is just a mechanical or physical type of communication because it does not involve the giving of self or the existing for another.

"Every kind of awareness is essentially awareness of something other than itself."[23] In this way a person whom I may love can be *other*. I may first be aware of *an other* person and then come to love him, thus converting the *him* or *it* into the thou-for-me. I can regard him objectively as a him and come to love so that we become *we*, and then there is communication between subjects rather than objects. Communication between two objects is different from that between subjects; it is impersonal and there remains a separation be-

tween the two persons who do not think of themselves as *us* though they may come to do so in time. R. Ostermann has noted that Marcel makes a metaphysical distinction between the order of the *lui* (him) and the order of the *toi* (thou)[24] and that it is within the order of the *toi* that personal communication takes place.

There are certain things of which we cannot have objective knowledge, and they are personality itself and those things that are related to the person, such as personal relations and human situations. One might say that you cannot have objective knowledge about that which is within the order of the *toi*, precisely as it is in the order of the *toi*. You can gain objective knowledge only about that which is classified within the order of the *lui*. You can have objective knowledge about objects, not about subjects.

One and the same thing could belong to both orders; that is, it could be both a him and a thou. For instance, I can consider my body which is a part of me as an object yet I can never consider my personality as an object—it is a subject. I belong to the order of the *toi* yet insofar as I consider my body as apart from myself I belong to the order of the *lui*.

In relation to the thou-character of another I might mention that the knowledge I have of a person whom I speak to as thou differs

[24]"Again it is a 'broken world' that faces us, only now it is divided into two levels called by Marcel the *lui* and the *toi*. When I speak of someone in the third person I am referring to the order of the *lui*; I regard him as though he were not there; his presence or absence is irrelevant to the discussion I may be pursuing, whether that be with someone else or myself" (Ostermann, The Modern Schoolman, xxxi [1954], 298).

[25]"This privileged knowledge which I have of a person whom I speak to as a thou, how does it differ from common impersonal knowledge? . . . In treating another as an object open to public enquiry I can build up a precise and objective knowledge of him in which he is one like myself and all others. In my communion with him as a thou I do not add to this kind of knowledge of him, what I know is not his common human nature but his personal existence, his presence in what he gives himself to and his presence with me. It is this exercise of this liberty which makes him not merely another but himself, a personal existence and not merely a human being. It is his presence or absence, his power to give or to withhold himself, that I experience, and this is his personal being which cannot be known objectively" (Harold J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers* [London, 1952], pp. 79-80).

[26]*Ibid.*, p. 80.

[27]*Ibid.*

[28]"Objectivity is bound up with the existence of a system of questions and answers, but conversely such a system supposes objectivity. And when I say objectivity I mean the continual strengthening of objectivity" (Marcel, *Metaphysical Journal*, p. 140).

[29]*Ibid.*

[30]Ostermann, The Modern Schoolman, xxxi (1954), 299.

[31]*Ibid.*, p. 300.

greatly from common impersonal knowledge. The knowledge I acquire of a person who is for me only a he is precise objective knowledge of his common human nature in which he is like all other people, but the knowledge I acquire in my communion with him as *thou* is knowledge of his personal existence and presence.[25] When I know a man as an object I have ideals and ideas concerning him, but if I know him as a thou I do not know him objectively because "his personal being cannot be known objectively."[26] I know him as a thou, I am open to him as a thou. I am open to him, and "insofar as I am truly open to him, it is he that is present to me, not my idea of him. And insofar as I have my ideal of him I am not truly open to him and do not experience him as present."[27] Another person who is a *thou* can be a medium through which certain information, based on objective fact that exists independently of communication, can be dialectically communicated. Communication which is between subjects supposes objectivity.[28] For instance, I may ask another person for directions to a certain city. "Such a question is given as answered in advance in objective fact (what I call *him* or *it*), but as only capable of receiving this answer by way of dialectics, through the medium of a thou; that is to say, by coming into communication with a wider and complimentary experience."[29]

The order of the *lui* multiplies and the order of the *loi* unifies.[30] The *lui* is impersonal while the *toi* is personal. The order of the *lui* separates things so that they can be known as individual numerical units. I can have a concept of the *lui* and gain objective knowledge of it. The order of the *toi* unifies or brings into community. I cannot have an idea of *toi* as I can of *lui*, but I can have personal experience of the *toi*. I have personal communication with the *thou* but not with the *him* or *it*.

In order to live humanly and attain the best possible community-life ". . . the passage from the *lui* to the *toi* and thence to the *nous* must be made."[31] Marcel finds the answer to the problem of human living and man's loneliness in communication and especially in the communion of love. Love of God, the Absolute Thou, is the best possible solution to the problem of the insularity of man's personality.

Tenth Annual Meeting (Continued from p. 106.)

John A. Gates was elected president for the coming year, and James Reagan (Saint Louis University) is the new secretary-treasurer. A vote of thanks was extended those who had participated in the meetings of the Congressional Committee on Disarmament, and thanks were extended to Washington University for its cordial hospitality. The next meeting will be held at Stephens College, Columbia.

THE VISION AT OSTIA: ACQUIRED OR INFUSED?

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Ever since Father Paul Henry, s.j., published his book, *La vision d'Ostie*,[1] there has been much discussion and speculation, writing and argumentation about St. Augustine's famous vision at Ostia. Father Henry's book, devoted entirely to the subject, is an effort on the author's part, first, to show Plotinus's vital influence upon Augustine; secondly, to bring out the importance of Monica in the scene; and finally, to state that this vision was something higher than "intellectual." Father Henry calls it mystical, a term he uses in the wide sense of the word.[2]

Mainly in agreement with his theory are Jean Pépin,[3] who departs from him on the point of reading a Plotinian mentality into the biblical texts St. Augustine uses in the account of the ecstasy, and Pierre Courcelle, who holds that Porphyry had an equal influence on the saint in his description of the Ostia scene.[4] Courcelle has demonstrated, also, that Augustine received much Neoplatonic influence through the eloquence of St. Ambrose at Milan.[5]

Two authors, André Mandouze [6] and John O'Meara,[7] accept the Plotinian texts which Father Henry has pointed out as influencing Augustine, but argue that he, Pépin, and Courcelle confined themselves too much to this scientific and mechanical method of arranging parallel texts.

Finally, Fathers Ephraem Hendrikx, o.e.s.a.,[8] and F. Cavallera, s.j.,[9] claim that this vision was nothing more than a high state of intellectual endeavor similar, perhaps, to the Milan experience of Book VII of the *Confessions*.

The question raised by these men is whether or not there was a difference in kind between Augustine's two ecstatic experiences.[10] They use various terms in their dicussion of the matter, which, generally speaking, respond to the two words used by mystical

theologians such as Father Joseph de Guibert, S.J.; namely, acquired and infused contemplation.[11]

The object of this article is not to show whether it was Plotinus or Porphyry who influenced Augustine in his description of the ecstasy, nor is it of concern to us whether the saint used biblical

[1]Paul Henry, S.J., *La vision d'Ostie* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938).

[2]The words Father uses are approximately equivalent to "acquired" and "infused," for whose definitions see below, n. 11.

[3]Jean Pépin, "Primitiae Spiritus," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, CXL (1951), 155-202.

[4]Pierre Courcelle, *Les lettres grecques en Occident* (2nd ed. Paris: de Boccard, 1948), pp. 163-68.

[5]Courcelle, *Recherches sur les* Confessions *de saint Augustin* (Paris : de Boccard, 1950), pp. 129-30: "Augustin, dans le récit de l'extase d'Ostie adopte, non la vue plotinienne, mais la rectification ambrosienne; sa mère et lui ont atteint la divinité immédiatement au-delà de *leurs* intelligences." The text in the *Confessions* (IX, x, 24): ". . . et venimus in mentes *nostras*." (Italics added.) The "rectification ambrosienne" is Ambrose's correction "to every intelligence," where Plotinus had said the Beautiful is immediately superior to Intelligence.

[6]André Mandouze, "L'extase d'Ostie," *Augustinus Magister, Communications* (Paris, 1954), pp. 67-84.

[7]John O'Meara, *The Young Augustine* (London: Longmans, 1954).

[8]Ephraem Hendrikx, O.E.S.A. "Augustins Verhältnis zur Mystik," *Cassiciacum*, I (1936), 132-49.

[9]F. Cavallera, S.J., "La contemplation d'Ostie," *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*, XX (1939), 181-96.

[10]The word "ecstasy" is being used in this article in the wide sense. Its criteria or definition may be taken from Father Joseph de Guibert, S.J., *The Theology of the Spiritual Life*, trans. Paul Barrett, O.F.M. Cap. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953), p. 354: "Thus ecstasy can be more properly defined as a state in which the spiritual powers of the soul are so deeply and powerfully fixed on some object that it (the soul) is made more or less completely incapable of receiving and feeling the stimuli of external sensible agents; and in this state either the intellectual or the affective powers of the soul may predominate."

[11]Father de Guibert, in his *Études de théologie mystique* (Toulouse: Éditions de la revue d'ascétique et de mystique et de l'apostolat de la prière, 1920) gives a definition of these terms on page 25: "La *contemplation acquise* est une oraison contemplative dans laquelle la simplification des actes intellectuels et affectifs résulte, par le simple jeu des lois psychologiques, de notre activité personnelle aidée de la grâce. La *contemplation infuse* est une oraison contemplative dans laquelle la simplification des actes intellectuels et affectifs résulte d'une action divine dans l'âme dépassant, ou même, parfois, contredisant, ce qu'auraient produit les simples causes d'ordre psychologique actuellement en jeu." The latter is the type of experience more properly called "mystical" in contemporary Catholic theology. See, for example, de Guibert, *Theology of the Spiritual Life*, pp. 9 ff. In this article the word "mystical" is used in this sense. When we speak of "infused" or "mystical," we do not deny that Augustine employs means in expressing his experience which are familiar to him in his everyday life. It is quite clear that he does speak in Neoplatonic terms.

Regarding the first definition, the words "aidée de la grâce" manifest that by "acquired" is not meant that God has no part in the ecstasy. And in fact, Augustine, in describing his previous experience at Milan (nothing more than a Plotinian ascent to the One), states explicitly that God was helping him (*Conf.*, VII, x, 16): ". . . te duce et potui, quoniam *factus es adiutor meus* [Ps. 29, 11]." Concerning this, Father Henry has pointed out the difference between Augustine and Plotinus in his *Plotin et l'Occident* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934), p. 114: "Tout en avouant sa dette en-

terminology to clothe his Neoplatonic ideas or not. The question at hand is whether the ecstasy described in Book IX of the *Confessions* was practically the same as that which Augustine described in Book VII, or whether there was something different; and if so, in what and how they differed.

St. Augustine does not tell us what kind of experience he and his mother had at Ostia. If it was mystical, he makes no mention of the Trinity, and the name of God is used only after it is all over.[12] Everyone will agree that his language is very much heightened and rather ecstatic throughout the passage. But so was it when he described the Milan scene in Book VII. Yet the writers cited in this article are in accord as to the fact that this latter was not a truly mystical experience. The further objection can be posed, too, that the account of this experience was actually written years after, during which time Augustine might easily have magnified it in his own mind. So, more than likely, it was not so beautiful as this. And finally comes the objection that he, in his exuberant enthusiasm and in an ardent fervor over his new-found faith and peace of mind, was carried away for the moment and only *thought* he had had some sort of mystical experience.

All three of these objections can be met with the same answer: If Augustine overestimated the vision, if he allowed it to grow through the years, or if he was carried away momentarily, then how do we account for Monica's actions? She, we must not forget, was present too, and was equally affected. And secondly, as will be stressed a little below, we judge this vision not by how Augustine or Monica *might* have felt at the time or later but by its fruits. And these are overwhelming for the opposite interpretation.

Upon close examination of the two accounts, there are a few details that show up in one and that do not appear in the other and weigh down the balance decidedly for the mystical interpretation of the Ostia vision. We have already said that the ecstasy at Milan was acquired, a genuine Plotinian ascent to the One. Precisely how does it differ from the vision at Ostia? The first thing that strikes us is its tone. The *finis* of the Ostia account is *ipsum, quem in his amamus,*[13] whereas in the Milan experience it is much more impersonal: *O aeterna veritas et vera caritas et cara aeternitas.*[14]

Besides this, there is the fact that at Milan Augustine had not yet surrendered his soul to God, whereas at Ostia he had not only undergone the pathetic and moving scene of the garden related in Book VIII, but he had just recently had all those gruesome sins of his past life washed off his soul by the powerful waters of baptism. He was ready, in other words, for a truly mystical visit from his Creator and Savior.

We notice in his account of the Milan ecstasy that Augustine says he could *not yet* eat the invisible things of God.[15] This single word *nondum* possibly carries with it overtones of no slight moment.[16] Does he mean here that he could not stand to fix his gaze for long

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vers Plotin, Augustin marque avec force ce qui le sépare de ce philosophe. Au moment même où il l'imite, il retourne en quelque sorte une de ses pensées. L'expression des *Ennéades* toute gonflée d'orgueil: μηκέτι τοῦ δείκνυντος δεηθῆς εἰς ἀτενίσας ἰδέ se change en un humble aveu sous la plume d'Augustin: *et potui quoniam factus es adiutor meus.* Qu'il est vif, le contraste entre la *praesumptio* et la *confessio*!"

[12]Augustine is recounting Monica's words: "Cumulatius hoc [that she should see her son a Catholic] mihi deus praestitit, ut te etiam contempta felicitate terrena servum eius videam" (*Conf.*, IX, x, 26).

[13]*Ibid.*, 25.

[14]*Ibid.*, VII, x, 16.

[15]". . . quae comedere nondum possem" (*ibid.*).

[16]Courcelle, *Recherches.* in the section entitled "Les vaines tentatives d'extases plotiniennes," pp. 157-67, has already, under n. 3, p. 167, italicized the word *nondum* in a quotation from Augustine's *De Beata Vita.* And throughout this section of his book, he shows how Augustine often wrote and spoke of the person who was unable to fix his gaze upon God because of his "mauvaise santé morale."

[17]*Conf.*, VII, x, 16. For the full text, see immediately below.

[18]For he says, "et inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis"; and a little later: "et clamasti de longinquo"; finally in VII, xvii, 23: "sed aciem figere non evalui et repercussa infirmitate redditus solitis non mecum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem, *quae comedere nondum possem*" (*ibid.*). (Italics added.)

[19]"Itaque avidissime arripui venerabilem stilum spiritus tui [God's] et prae ceteris apostolum Paulum, et perierunt illae quaestiones, in quibus mihi aliquando visus est adversari sibi et non congruere testimoniis legis et prophetarum textus sermonis eius . . ." (*ibid.*, xxi, 27).

[20]"Et aliud est de silvestri cacumine videre patriam pacis et iter ad eam non invenire et frustra conari per invia circum obsidentibus et insidiantibus fugitivis desertoribus cum principe suo leone et dracone, et aliud tenere viam illud ducentem cura caelestis imperatoris munitam, ubi non latrocinantur qui caelestem militiam deseruerunt" (*ibid.*, xxii, 27).

[21]". . . sicut nunc extendimus nos et rapida cogitatione attingimus aeternam sapientiam super omnia manentem, *si continuetur hoc* et subtrahantur aliae visiones longe inparis generis et haec una rapiat et absorbeat et recondat in interiora gaudia spectatorem suum, *ut talis sit sempiterna vita, quale fuit hoc momentum intelligentiae,* cui suspiravimus, nonne hoc est: intra in gaudium domini tui?" (*ibid.*, IX, x, 25). (Italics added.)

[22]". . . et mundus iste nobis inter verba vilesceret cum omnibus delectationibus suis . . ." (*ibid.*, 26).

[23]"Fili, quantum ad me adtinet, nulla re iam delector in hac vita. Quid hic faciam adhuc et cur hic sim, nescio . . ." (*ibid.*).

on the *invisibilia* of God because he was not yet (*nondum*) a Catholic? Perhaps. But it seems equally probable that in writing this in Book VII he was thinking of his Ostia vision, which he would describe in Book IX. After all, this sentence (in Book VII) has to do with an ecstasy and would it not be very likely that he was thinking of another such experience? If this is the case, the word *nondum* may give us an insight into Augustine's mind on the problem, although it is not conclusive. He was not yet able, but would be, after his baptism, to gaze unhindered at *ipsum, quem in his amamus.* There would no longer be only an *amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem.*[17]

Finally, we must look at the fruits of Ostia and compare them with those of Milan. We know that Augustine was not completely satisfied with the taste of *veritas* which he received in Book VII;[18] and although this experience was a reawakening for him wherein he saw for the first time what spirituality was, nevertheless he did not find the real answer to his problem in the books of the Platonists; but, as he tells us, he avidly took up the venerable quill of God's spirit and above all the Apostle Paul, before those questions about the apparent contradictions in scripture could be dissolved.[19] Furthermore, in the very last paragraph of Book VII, he makes an admission which indicates to us beyond any doubt that he was left unsatisfied with the Milan ecstasy. It is his beautiful sentence on the difference between the man (such as he was in Book VII) who has seen the "fatherland of peace" but has not seen the road leading to it, and the one who holds the way leading there, that road which is fortified by the care of the heavenly ruler.[20]

Such a man as this latter was Augustine at Ostia. Here there was complete satisfaction, complete rest, the desire to sit and contemplate indefinitely.[21] And the outcome was an entire orientation towards heavenly things for both Augustine and his mother. They no longer had any desires for earthly sweets.[22] For Monica especially was this true, for she says, "My son, as far as I am concerned, nothing any longer delights me in this life. What I am still doing here and why I am here, I know not . . ."[23] And a few days later, when she was lying on her deathbed, she showed her complete indifference to created things by canceling her previously determined wish to be

buried beside her husband in Africa. This was very surprising to Augustine, who spends much time detailing Monica's insistence in this regard.[24] But he goes on to ask why he should wonder; for she did not seem to want to die in her fatherland the day they were talking together at Ostia, when she exclaimed, "What am I doing here?"

Monica, then, who up to the time of the vision had still clung to a few earthly attachments, has, as a result of the ecstasy, lost all desire for everything that savors of this earth. Is this not a singular factor and strong enough to convince us that this vision was far greater than an acquired contemplation? Great and lofty natural experiences, gained through the mind's own efforts, are enough sometimes to raise us above ourselves; but never do they raise us up to the Creator to a degree where we no longer possess any worldly desires. This is the operation of God through spiritual means.

Augustine, too, seems to be changed by the vision. There are two texts which bear this out. The first is something he himself says immediately after describing the vision, and the second is a remark that his mother makes. He begins paragraph twenty-six with these words:

> Such were the things I spoke, although not in this manner nor in these words, nevertheless, Lord, You know, that on that day, when we spoke these things and this world with all its delights became worthless *to us* among our words, then she said . . .[25]

The one word *nobis* points to a change that had been effected in the hearts of both mother and son equally. On that day, he says, this world became worthless to us. True, Augustine had already been baptized. But does that mean that since then, or since the "tolle, lege" scene of Book VIII, he no longer had any desires for this world? Certainly he had been turned to God and had made a complete offering of himself. But this vision cleansed his heart of the last vestiges of worldliness and set him on the straight path to great sanctity.

[24]". . . quod noveram, quanta cura semper aestuasset de sepulchro, quod sibi providerat et praeparaverat iuxta corpus viri sui" (*ibid.*, xi, 28).

[25]The Latin reads: "Dicebam talia, etsi non isto modo et his verbis, tamen, domine, tu scis, quod illo die, cum talia loqueremur et mundus iste nobis inter verba vilesceret cum omnibus delectationibus suis, tunc ait illa . . ."

[26]The important sentence, of course, is: "Cumulatius hoc mihi deus praestitit, *ut te etiam contempta felicitate terrena servum eius* videam" (*Conf.*, IX, x, 26). (Italics added.)

[27]*Ibid.*, I, i, 1.

The second text is taken from the same paragraph. Monica is speaking:

> There was only one reason why I desired to delay a little longer in this life, that I might see you a Catholic before I die. God has granted to me something more abundant than this, that I should see you as His servant now that you have also contemned the joys of this earth.[26]

What does she mean when she says God has granted her something over and above the gift of seeing her son a Catholic? After all, was not this the one thing she had been praying for and weeping over during the last thirty years? But she says *cumulatius*. And what is that? That he has trampled under foot all earthly joy. And when did this take place? Right here at the vision of Ostia.

The vision at Ostia was a singular grace accorded Augustine and his mother, for it turned them permanently toward God, to whom all must eventually come. And though the ecstatic experience of Milan did accomplish this to a limited degree, it was only the fruit of personal exertion aided by grace; for Augustine could not yet give up his sinful life, nor did he rest in this first experience. But the vision at Ostia was of a decidedly higher kind. And this higher type of ecstasy seems equivalent to what theologians call infused contemplation. For it was at Ostia that he learned the detachment of the saints; it was at Ostia that he found that rest for which all our hearts are restless, *quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te!*[27]

A Nonexistent Corpus Articuli

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In the first part of the *Summa Theologiae*, q. 91, a. 4, St. Thomas Aquinas wonders if the production of the human body is fittingly described in the Scriptures. For some reason, this article is without a response. A persual of different editions of the *Summa* seems to indicate that the incompleteness of Question 91 has been, thus far, unnoticed.

The Ottawa edition, with an outstanding critical apparatus, makes no mention of this singular fact (Vol. I, p. 567, a. 42). Yet it would seem that the *respondeo* and the *dicendum ad primum*, not being separated by the usual paragraph, would have attracted the attention of the editors or readers.

The Leonine edition (Vol. V, pp. 394-95) sheds little light on this matter, although Cajetan's commentary reads: "Titulus clarus. In corpore una conclusio responsiva . . ." (p. 395).

Prior to the Leonine, little awareness of the strange constitution of this article exists, except for a hint, perhaps, in F. Lachat, *Somme théologique de St Thomas d'Aquin* (4ª éd. Paris: Vives, 1880), III, 465-66. There one reads, "The demonstration will take place in the reply to the objections" (p. 466). Since, however, this edition is said to offer "the best commentaries, with the French and Latin texts," one could take this statement to be the commentary on this article.

The English translation (New York Benziger, 1947), p. 465, drops the "I answer that" and passes immediately from the "On the Contrary" to "Reply Obj. 1."

An Experimentalist on Being

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I

Of all the great philosophies now in contention throughout the world, two of the most virile and persuasive are Thomism and experimentalism. Standing opposed to one another, these two world views periodically hurl thunderbolts of dialectic across the reaches of the intellectual community in hopes of winning more and more followers and of showing to thoughtful men how human experience can be rendered intelligible and manageable.

The polemic that ensues is, of course, difficult to follow, partly because of the widely differing premises of the two positions but in greater measure because of different syntactical grammars and terminological vocabularies used by each side. What results is a puzzling display of logic leading to contrasting conclusions, with each camp using its own terms and syntax to expound and fortify its own position.

In time, each side becomes more and more interested in the development of its own doctrine and less and less concerned with that of its opponent. Finally, the questions posed by one side are disregarded as irrelevant by the other, and dialectic withers and dies.

Maybe there is some necessity for this impasse, perhaps some epistemological and or psychological determinism that eventually takes hold of philosophical discourse and sends the contending parties irrevocably into a condition of mutual isolation each from the other.

But on the assumption that no such determinism is at work, it may be worthy of experiment to see what one school of thought could do with a major doctrine of the other—in this case, what an experimentalist analysis would be of the Thomist's metaphysical notion of being. It is to be understood that this venture is taken with great risk, principally because of the necessity to find an easy cross-reference for two dissimilar philosophical grammars—the problem mentioned earlier. But if this semantic qualification is understood and accepted in advance, then the risk seems worth the taking.

It is well known that experimentalism has never felt the necessity to involve itself unduly in metaphysics. It may appear surprising, therefore, to find an experimentalist voluntarily venturing into this area and choosing to deal with the notion of being. In thus seeming to join battle on ground

chosen by the adversary, the philosophic adventurer may appear not only a bold and reckless Quixote, tilting with a tradition of scholarship centuries old and represented by some of the greatest minds of the Western world, but also somewhat of a traitor to his own cause, venturing forth on a campaign which has no direct bearing on the major conflict and whose outcome is prejudiced in advance.

I wish at the outset to disavow both grandiose intentions in the first instance and subversive designs in the second. On the other hand, it seems to me that experimentalists' reluctance to probe the realm of metaphysics is not altogether justified. In many ways the Thomists are correct when they insist that this avoidance of metaphysics not only represents a failure to meet a major intellectual challenge but produces a void that experimentalism, if it is to be called a philosophy at all, must somehow fill. If experimentalism is to present itself for the reasonable consideration of men and as something more than a method of thinking, then it behooves it to meet and somehow deal with questions which other philosophies pose to it; and it is my feeling that the problem of being is such an issue which experimentalism has never fully dealt with.

Dewey sought, in his *Experience and Nature*, to give the metaphysical underpinnings of his position; but neither there nor elsewhere has he come squarely to grips with the problem of being as it is understood by Thomists. What, in short, does it mean to exist? The Thomists have an answer. Do the experimentalists?

It seems to me that they do; and if these modest probings in search of the answer have any legitimacy, then we may venture the hypothesis that experimentalists indeed have a notion of existence and being which is as tenable and defensible, at least to them, as that of the Thomist is to him. There is no intention, therefore, to rebut Thomism in any serious way but merely to point to the possibility that experimentalism is not without its metaphysical dimension, even though as a philosophy it has never taken the intellectual trouble to make it explicit.[1]

II

We may properly commence our investigation by considering the problem of essence. The first approach we have to the "whatness" of a thing, as Thomists will agree, is its operations. We begin to understand

[1]Although appearing infrequently, there have been some significant excursions in this direction, the most noteworthy of which are: Sidney Hook, *The Metaphysics of Pragmatism* (Chicago: Open Court, 1927) and "The Quest for Being," *Journal of Philosophy* (Nov. 19, 1953), pp. 709-31; John L. Childs, *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism* (New York) chap. 3; and Lawrence G. Thomas, "The Ontology of Experimentalism," *Educational Theory* (July, 1956), pp. 177-83.

something from the way it behaves, acts, or operates in our experience. Now, to the Thomist, these operations are only surface manifestations of an inner whatness, and they must be accounted for by some constituent which makes them what they are and not something else. What lies beneath the operations, what gives rise to them, what, in short, accounts for their being, is the *essence* of the thing in question. Thus we see that man has some operations which can be classified as animal and others which can be termed rational. Hence man is a rational animal. But what makes him animal and what makes him rational is his essence, which underlies both. To the Thomist it is not so accurate to say that man *is* a rational animal as to speak of him as an essence which *possesses* animality and rationality.

It is noteworthy, it seems to me, that Thomists are unable to speak of an essence in any terms other than its operations. All that can be said of an essence is (1) that it is an *X* which by definition is that which accounts for the operations or actions of the thing, (2) that this *X* receives the act of existence, and (3) that upon this receipt it forthwith sets into being the operations which we observe in our experience.

Now the experimentalist is not inclined to look beneath operations for unknown X's which account for them. He sees in this intellectual step the genesis of a host of difficulties which have plagued philosophy for more than two thousand years. He is content, for good or ill, to accept the operations of things as they are; he accepts the existence of operations; and this is as far as he feels warranted to go. The experimentalist holds that a thing *is* its operations and nothing more, and in so doing he of course departs not only from St. Thomas but from Aristotle himself. To speak of any *thing* is to speak of its actions, its behavior, its motions and operations. And when we speak of existence we speak of the existence of these operations, not the existence of some inert, motionless thing (essence) which *has* actions. We see, then, that an existing essence is to the experimentalist an existing cluster of operations and that a being, in its primal condition, is not an essence existing so much as operations existing.

Man then does not possess reason and animality; he *is* reason and animality, as well as a host of other operations which we experience in our dealings with him. Whenever the operations of reason and animality (and these many others) enter our experience in some observable relationship to one another, we say we have a man.

Now what this means to the experimentalist, to repeat, is that man *is* his operations, that the whatness of man or any other being *is* its behaviors and actions which are experienced by us. It is therefore the existence of operations rather than the existence of essences which con-

stitutes the primary metaphysical premise for the experimentalist. What precisely does it mean to say that an operation *exists*?

When the intellect proceeds into this terrain it is indeed on unfamiliar ground. The modern mind is poorly equipped to deal with this idea, and this is due to the fact that we all, experimentalists included, are children of Aristotelian logic and inheritors of over two thousand years of dualistic thinking. It is only with the greatest difficulty that we can even take up the abstract notion of the existence of operations, much less set down the thesis in clear and comprehensible language. Here the experimentalist is about at the place where the Thomist finds himself when he begins to speak of the existence of essences—in a stratosphere of thought where the air is thin and the breathing is correspondingly difficult.

What can we say of the existence of operations? A clarification of the term itself may be of help. To the experimentalist an operation is relational; it refers to what occurs *between* aspects of reality, rather than to aspects of reality themselves. Indeed, reality is redefined here to refer to what relates "things" rather than to the "things" themselves. For "things," to experimentalists, *are* their relationships to other "things." A leaf is green; its greenness constitutes one of its operations. But this operation does not come into existence until it is conceived in relational terms, until there is an organism to see the greenness, attach meaning to it, and thus respond in some way to it. A leaf is also edible, and edibility is one of its operations; but this operation refers to a relationship between the leaf and something else—an eating organism—and does not come into existence until the organism carries through its operation of eating the leaf.

We are readily prepared to acknowledge our heavy reliance in the above on essentialistic language—the liberal use of the substantive pronoun "it," for instance—but this should occasion no trouble provided we remember that any substantive, in an experimentalist sense, is operationally conceived; it is viewed as a catalogue of actions and behaviors, or as a center or pole serving as a locus for the operations which constitute it. In this regard it is noteworthy, to the experimentalist, that the term "thing," one of the most familiar and frequently used substantives, ends in the gerundive *ing*. Among its many dictionary meanings are several whose etymological derivations are connotative of its verbal structure; that is, action, behavior, process.

In some ways, therefore, we can begin to see—and this is our second note on operations—that the ontological existent here under scrutiny, an operation, is not a *thing* in the substantive sense but an *event*. Something is happening, transpiring; and our use of the substantive term "something" again reveals that the word in common parlance refers

to events as well as to inert "things." Properly considered, things are really events taking place, not isolated and independent essences exercising the act of existence. A "thing," to conclude, is a cluster of operations, and operations are events transpiring, occurrences happening; and in the transpiring and happening the events and occurrences can be said to be *existing*.

To be seen in all of this are the underlying reasons for the experimentalist's insistence on the principle of continuity. The very concept of operation signifies a connection between things—a seeing organism with something seen, an eating organism with something eaten, a breathing organism with air. What constitutes reality, in the experimentalist sense, is what connects things rather than what separates and distinguishes them. Man is not separated from nature; he is one with it. His animal operations of nutrition, reproduction, and growth represent relationships with his environment; and his rational processes are of the very same order. The operation of knowing is merely another and higher operation performed by a natural organism; it represents another connection, another type of linkage, another mode of relationship existing in the world.

Thus we can say that a real world, a world of relationships, very probably existed prior to man but that knowledge of this world did not. It was not until an organism constituted in part by the operation of knowing arrived on the scene that knowledge could arise. It is for this reason that experimentalists insist that truth, as a product of knowledge, dates from man's arrival. There was no truth before his emergence because there was no process of knowing which could lead to it. Moreover, truth itself is in this sense simply another name for functional knowledge, knowledge that is usable in the organism's interaction with his environment.

The experimentalist's epistemology is therefore conceived in terms of verification, the making of truth, rather than, in the case of the Thomist, in terms of discovery, the finding of antecedent truth. When Columbus discovered America he added something to reality. It is correct to say that the continent was there before he sailed, and the Thomist would be inclined to say he did not add anything to the world but only changed the map. But the map after all is part of the world; and its post-Columbian refinement represented a new relationship added into the world, an increment of functionally usable knowledge coming into existence in our universe. Truth, so conceived, is made, not found out.

Obviously, then, if truth is the handiwork of man, it must remain in a perpetual condition of verification day by day, being tested and tried in the on-going experience of man. This is why the experimentalist insists that truth is a relative concept and that a statement about our experience is

true only in the degree to which its use in our experience is meaningful; that is, only insofar as the idea, when acted upon, leads to consequences that render the world more intelligible and more manageable.

It is only when we are prisoners of dualism, the dualism of man *and* nature, of mind looking out on reality, that we view truth as discovery of antecedent reality. Once man is seen *within* nature, once he is made continuous with it, the multitudes of epistemological puzzles stemming from Aristotelian dualism dissolve.

And so when the experimentalist clarifies his epistemology he reaps rewards also in the clarification of his metaphysics. Once he sees himself as operationally *within* nature rather than as a spectator *of* it, his view of reality comes into focus. This reality, we have said, is "composed of" existing operations. And since what exists are operations and events—both dynamic rather than static terms—reality is fundamentally characterized by flux. Reality is a dynamic, moving, changing "thing"; more precisely, it is a continuing event, not an immobile totality of substances whose motions and changes must somehow be "explained."

The act of existence is exercised not by essences but by relationships *between* "essences." "To be" is not to receive the act of existence in solitude; it is not the receipt from some higher source of the act of presence in this universe as a single and solitary thing as is the case with Thomistic essences. "To be" means *to be happening, to be occurring*, in the world; and to happen, to occur, means to be involved in dynamic relationship with other "things" that are happening. Being, in this sense, is truly and genuinely *one*, undivided, indivisible, continuous. Thomists go to great lengths to describe the *unum* of being, and this presents a problem to them precisely because being by their definition appears plural; for example, many separate essences existing, many different levels in the hierarchy of being, and so on. For the experimentalist no such problem need arise; being is the existence of operations, and operations signify continuity. Being is one and continuous. All "parts" of being are connected, and this is so precisely because *it is the connections themselves that are real*; and it is the essences, the inert forms which presumably give rise to the connections, that are products of our intellectual imagination, constituting merely an invented metaphysical species.

Likewise with the other side of the coin; that is, the problem of individuation. Once having seen being as *unum*, the Thomist must now explain how it is possible to have an individual being. Much energy is expended here also. But to the experimentalist this is a pseudo-problem. The idea of individuality itself presupposes a separation between so-called essences, a discrete and clear-cut line which represents the boundary between one "thing" and another. But this is not so, for "things" are never

isolated and set apart from other "things." Viewed operationally and relationally they are always in some kind of relationship to other "things." Their very "essence," if you please, is their connectedness to other "things." A being is one with reality, is in constant touch with it, and indeed cannot escape a relational connection with it save by passing out of existence altogether. To speak of an individual being, then, is to reify an abstraction which does not exist in the substantive sense.

To say that this means that individual beings do not exist is ridiculous; it only means that individual beings viewed as essences do not exist. The idea of an individual being somehow signifies a being separated from all other beings. And this is accomplished in Thomistic metaphysics when a being is primordially defined as a separate entity (as an essence existing). But under an operational definition of a being, in which a being is viewed as an event transpiring, as a serial sequence of operations happening, then individuality takes on an entirely different meaning. It is the differentiated qualities of occurrences that enable us to apply the term "individual" to them for the practical purposes of analysis and description. In other words, the term "individual" is a "relational" concept, requiring extension to other individualities, if only by way of contrast. Thus a stone can be called an individual being because it (that is, its actions and behaviors) can be singled out for special attention and study. But these actions and behaviors can be properly thought about only in relationship to the framework of the actions and operations of other beings. A stone's weight is never isolated from the earth, whose gravitational attraction gives it weight, or from the hand of man or the scales he has invented which measure its weight. Its color and shape are never isolated from the organism which perceives it visually and gives meaning to that color and that shape, which perception and meaning are the very significance and reality of whatever is said to exist.

So likewise with a man. He is an individual only insofar as his *being* as an event can be thought of or perceived as related to other events. But since his being, in this operational sense, always depends on the being of other operations (other beings) it is a mistake to view him as an individual in any absolute and "essential" way. Like all other beings, he is inextricably "plugged in" to nature and can be fully understood in no other way. To separate him from it, to "unplug" him, is to obliterate him; that is, to deny his existence.

We return once again to our primary ontological concern. If being is operations or events, it may be asked what force calls them into existence? What, in short, causes events to be? But this is the same as asking, "What causes being to be ?" At long last, the ultimate terminus of the

begged question is finally reached, and we now enter the dark environs of tautology. The question has no answer because it has no meaning.

To the Thomist, being does indeed have a cause: itself. The Thomistic self-existent, God, is the culminating union of existence and essence. God's essence is "to be." As such, God stands with all other beings in the possession of an essence. But at the same time, He stands apart from all other beings by virtue of His omnipotent capacity to grant the gift of existence to essences. The manner in which this form of omnipotence is exercised concerning His own essence (that is, existence) is a dizzying succession of revolving, semantic puzzles to non-Thomists and one of the most impenetrable areas of Thomistic doctrine.

The experimentalist, on the other hand, is supremely naive concerning his view of being. Being is merely undergone. He experiences its operations and relationships, and takes them for what they are. He offers no magnificent pyramidal hierarchies to explain it; he simply experiences it, endeavoring to be honest in what he reports about it. In studying and reporting on it, the experimentalist is experiencing operations and events, not things. With this in mind, he suggests that our view of being shift from the substantive to the operational. That is to say, being, to a Thomist, is like a noun; to an experimentalist, like a verb. And as a verb, the experimentalist's being is constantly being created; that is, in a condition of continual becoming rather than of final being. In this sense, the perpetual emergence of operations and relations, motions and actions, represents its genuine becoming-ness.

III

Thus we are forced to pass over into a whole new realm of thought, a whole new conception of being, a completely uncharted and virgin terrain where the intellect has never trod. We do this, or we attempt to do it, in somewhat the same way that Aristotle ventured beyond the pre-Socratics and St. Thomas beyond Aristotle, although there is never any certain confidence that we are on the right track.

But the challenge is there, and metaphysical curiosity requires a meeting of it. Thomists are often wont to point out that the major contribution of St. Thomas was to catch a glimpse of being which was at the same time both quite different from, and vastly more profound than, the Aristotelian glimpse of being. They are equally ready to say, to the immense discomfiture of every post-Thomistic thinker, that St. Thomas's word on being was indeed the last word and that no new vision of being is possible. It is this closing of the argument, this finale to the debate, which non-Thomists feel is arbitrary, without sufficient warrant, and no more legitimate today than it would have been in the thirteenth century. And this criticism, the experimentalist feels, is justified whether his

vision of being has any validity or not. Indeed, it seems to be the prime mark of distinction between Thomism and the modern philosophies that Thomism wishes to declare a permanent moratorium on new intuitions of being, to issue a clarion call to all metaphysicians to settle upon the vision provided by St. Thomas, and to rally round for the great task of consolidating and interpreting this ultimate and final insight.

To declare this is to shut down the intellectual industry once and for all—perhaps not the assembly line where new refinements can be made on the product year by year, but certainly the research laboratory where a totally new and different product may be discovered to place in production. But we should know by now that men—ancient, medieval, or modern—cannot live without research laboratories. Would Thomism deny them this most fundamental requirement for meaningful existence? Life under such circumstances, says the experimentalist, would no longer be worth living.

A Thomist on "An Experimentalist on Being"

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I am in full sympathy with the intent of Dr. Morris's paper. It has seemed to me also an odd and a regrettable thing that two highly sophisticated traditions of philosophizing should exist side by side in our culture with almost no serious intercommunication. On another occasion I described this situation:

> The great shift in philosophical conceptions brought about by the late mediaeval and early modern thinkers has dislocated the traditional lines of discussion. In fact, a new scheme of problems has been set up and, consequently, a realinement of philosophical evidence has become imperative. The arguments now lie not at the level of high theory but in the most basic area of primary evidence. The disagreements cut all the way down, through the very facts themselves which serve as the basis of philosophical development. Often enough and indeed perhaps increasingly, discussions within Thomism and other types of philosophy have gone on in separated worlds. The brilliant and profound works of many a Thomistic thinker simply offer no avenue of entrance to other thinkers. No bridges of understanding and criticism can be built between theory and theory.[1]

As Dr. Morris knows, I have myself attempted to construct a bridge—a sort of small handrail bridge, to be sure—between Thomism and naturalism. It seems to me that there are three types of blueprints for such bridges.

One may attempt to anchor one end of the bridge in an elaborated doctrine of one tradition and the other end in an analogous elaborated doctrine in the other tradition. Now, any elaborated doctrine of this sort is a highly complex matter. No single line of evidence moves up to it; it cannot be understood in isolation; it implies a whole series of interrelated conclusions which illumine and support it. Thus, a metaphysical theory has an epistemological brace; a theory in ethics may incorporate the conclusions of metaphysical speculation. This sort of bridge pulls the *total* traditions into mutual confrontation.

Moreover, no matter what our elaborated theories of experience, evidence, and so forth, may be, we do all start with some sort of crude fact and crude experience which are common to us all. When we attempt to give a philosophical account of our common experience, we begin to move apart. Here is the point, it seems to me, at which we truly make the determining options. This initial divergence, which, at first, may seem very slight, orientates our philosophizing at different angles to the common base in experience so that the more elaborate our theorizings become, the wider grows the divergence. When, then, doctrines at a high level of elaboration are brought to confrontation, the communications engineer, in effect, is attempting to throw a bridge across the widest section of the chasm.

I do not wish to say that this sort of undertaking is wholly futile. It may well be that it does contribute to clarification and mutual understanding. However, at present, I am inclined to think that this method will not truly bring our minds together or make us face the fundamental issues.

Dr. Morris seems to me to have chosen this method of approach, since he has selected a highly elaborated metaphysical position in Thomism and set over against it an analogous position within naturalism. He has himself stipulated some of the difficulties involved; and his paper, I think, bears out the critique I have just made of this method. Of course, it must be remembered that Dr. Morris was interested in an additional purpose: he not only wished to set up communication but to develop the doctrine of naturalism itself.

There is another approach which is more like parachuting into hostile

[1]"Realism: A Phenomenological Approach," a paper prepared as a basis for discussion at the 1955 meeting of the Missouri Philosophical Society, Appendix 1, pp. 17-18.

[2]The following discussion is directed primarily to page 129 of Professor Morris's paper. Throughout, all italics, in citations from his paper, have been added.

[3]By giving myself the dramatic date 1492, I necessarily remove myself from the Society of Jesus; hence the dramatic *Fra*.

territory than like building a bridge. A man may attempt to enter into a philosophical tradition other than his own, to become part of it, to see it from the inside. This is obviously a difficult task. It requires a radical sincerity and an unusual intellectual versatility. For a man must, by a sort of tour de force, put his own convictions in temporary brackets, wash his mind of his own basic attitudes, and actually think within the new tradition. Having done this (if it can be done), he is prepared to enter into meaningful discussion and engage in an internal and constructive criticism. How successfully this can be done, I do not really know; but more efforts should be made to do it.

Finally, there is a third possibility. We can return to the common base in crude experience, to the beginnings, where divergence is slight, and hold our gaze on the common evidence to which we can all at least point. We can hold our restive reflection at this point and attempt to develop a pre-systematic description of the crude facts. Commonly, we are too eager to get on with our sophisticated elaborations, too ready to impose our theories on the facts, to interpret, almost by legerdemain, experience in terms of our theories, and to fit everything, even at the price of Procrustean reductions, into overarching theories. The method here needed I have elsewhere called a sort of "phenomenology," for it consists in a steady reflection on, and intellectual penetration of, the "given." I consider this method the most promising of the three outlined here, and I shall attempt to use it as far as the present discussion will allow. I do not mean to imply that this method is *easier* than the others; it sets a laborious and treacherous task, but, I think, it contains the greatest promise of ultimate success.

I shall not, then, be able to deal with the wide range of elaborated positions discussed by Dr. Morris. I shall have to limit myself to one or two points.[2]

Searching Dr. Morris's paper for some common hold on experience, I find that he introduces into an epistemological discussion the example of Columbus's discovery of America. Let us pick up the discussion at this point and, in order to make it as concrete as possible, let us imaginatively dramatize the situation.

LOOKOUT: Land ho! (COLUMBUS *rushes to the deck followed by* PROFESSOR MORRIS *and* FRA[3] HENLE. *A dark smudge is to be seen off the port bow.*)

COLUMBUS: Land! Gracias a Dios!

PROFESSOR MORRIS: Land!

FRA HENLE (*since I know him so well, I can predict of him more surely what he would have said, had he been there*): Oh, come now. We've been squinting over the sea so long, how can we tell what it

is? It could be a low cloud or a mirage. Maybe we're having a mass hallucination.

COLUMBUS: Madre de Dios, no! It's land! (*So the ship rolls, bounces, glides closer. The smudge comes up out of the sea; sand and beach, trees and hills take form. The anchor strikes through the water. The three climb down into a small boat; it grinds onto the sand. They pull it up and stand on the beach.*)

PROFESSOR MORRIS: It *is* land!

FRA HENLE: Van Cleve, amigo—you're right! It *is* land!

This was the situation. Now what happened in the order of knowledge? One thing we can agree upon. Before we sailed from Spain, the land to which we came was there, across the ocean. (Professor Morris writes: "It is correct to say that the continent was there before he [Columbus] sailed." To simplify matters, I have substituted "land" for "continent," since the latter was beyond the immediate evidence of the landing.) Columbus's discovery and knowledge of this land did not bring it into being, did not give it the distinctive qualities which differentiate it from the water. The land and sand and trees were "there" before ever Columbus left the Old World. In this sense Columbus found, discovered, came upon, encountered, and had an "interaction" with an antecedently existing reality.

Now, when Columbus (and his two anachronistic companions) stepped ashore, when he "encountered" the land, what happened? He encountered it at a level of mere contact ($contact_1$); he stood on it as a leaf falling on it, or a fish washed up from the sea, or a rock hurled up by the waves. But because he wasn't a rock or a dead fish, *through* this contact ($contact_1$) something else happened. He became aware of the land; he grasped it, acknowledged it as a reality, objective, independent, presented to him; he knew it ($contact_2$).

Had Columbus been a stone, only $contact_1$ would have occurred; since he was the sort of thing that is capable of knowing (as Dr. Morris says, "an organism constitued in part by the operation of knowing"), $contact_2$ took place. This is to say, what took place in the encounter was conditioned and determined not only by the antecedently existent land but by the antecedently existent knower or knowing organism. Before he sailed, he was a knowing organism; if he was "in part constituted by the operation

[4]Thomism rejects the theories which are commonly called the "spectator theory of knowledge" and the "representational theory." The blanket identification of Thomism with these theories is a stereotype which we must ask experimentalism to give up, if we are ever to talk together with understanding. It is noteworthy that Thomistic epistemology is omitted from Dewey's last chapter in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1938) in which he undertook to consider "some of the main types of epistemological theory" (p. 514). I suspect that he thought his types included Thomism, but I am unable to identify a relevant type in his chapter.

of knowing," he was not, at that time, constituted even in part by *this* operation of knowing; that is, the operation of knowing this bit of land. When he sailed, he was, unlike the ship he sailed in, capable of this operation of knowing; but it was not yet part of his existent reality.

Within contact$_2$, therefore, a new operation came to be in the knower or the knowing organism—the operation of knowing this land.[4] In the case of the three characters in our little drama, there are three existentially distinct operations of knowing, produced or carried on by each knower. In this sense knowledge is produced by a knowing organism; and we can all agree, I believe, with Professor Morris that in a material world devoid of knowing organisms there would be no knowledge or truth.

Now when Fra Henle said to Professor Morris, "You are right; it *is* land," he was talking about a rightness in Professor Morris's knowledge, in the operation of knowing which Professor Morris produced in interaction with the land. Fra Henle was asserting that Professor Morris's knowledge was right inasmuch as it fitted the fact, grasped the antecedently existing land as being indeed existing land. It is this rightness which arises within a knowing operation that a Thomist calls epistemological truth. Since it is an attribute (though a relational one) of the knowledge produced by an operation of the knower, it is, in this sense, "made" by the knower, "not found out." In this sense, the Thomist maintains that there is no antecedent truth; in this sense, too, the operations of knowledge in the three actors and the truth-attributes of these knowledges are an increase in the reality of the knower and so of the total reality of the universe. When the Thomist says that knowledge does not add to reality, he means that Columbus did not make the "land"; the "land" was already *there*, washed by waves and whipped by winds. Dr. Morris seems to agree with this ("The continent [read *land*] was there"). The Thomist, however, quite agrees that Columbus's knowledge was a "new relationship added into the world."

This is the Thomistic view; and with it, so far, Dr. Morris seems really to agree.

Now, it is then obvious that truth in the epistemological sense is a relational attribute (the Thomist says that it consists in a relation). However, it is equally obvious that, though it is produced in the operation of knowing and is therefore "made" by the knower, it is not produced in complete disregard of the objects with which the knowledge deals or, in this case at least, with no operational dependence on the objects.

In fact, in a very important sense, it was the land itself, which, entering into an interaction with these knowing organisms, determined them to know "land," to know *this* "land" and to know it here and now.

Thus, when Fra Henle admitted, "It *is* land," he did so on the basis

of his experience. In the very interaction with the land, the land presented itself to him. There it was. The knowledge-operation in Fra Henle was formally true not only because it fitted the facts but because Fra Henle knew it fitted the facts; he had the evidence or "verification" in the very act of knowing. Thomistic epistemology is, therefore, conceived not only "in terms of discovery" but also "in terms of verification,"[5] not only in terms of "the making of truth" but also in terms of "finding of antecedent" —not "truth"—but "reality" (in this case the "land," or Professor Morris's "continent").[6] Thomistic epistemology attempts to interrelate all these aspects because any concrete knowledge situation displays all these aspects. When he considers concrete fact ("The continent was there"), Professor Morris seems to agree with all this; when he repeats theory ("It is only when we are prisoners of dualism . . . that we view truth as discovery of antecedent reality"), he seems to reject one or other aspect.

Hence, if truth is relational, it is not what is commonly meant by

[5]The very nature of knowledge and truth forces the Thomistic epistemologist as well as the experimentalist to consider the nature and problem of "verification." The Thomist usually does so under the rubric of "objective evidence and its modes." There is this striking difference: The Thomist considers the experimentalist account of verification adequate for some cases (for example, the verification of a second-level scientific hypothesis) but too restricted and narrow in view of the wide variety displayed by human knowing. He holds, therefore, that the experimentalist's generalization, as *restrictive*, is *empirically* deficient.

[6]I am unable to reconcile (1) "Thus we can say that a real world, a world of relationships, very probably *existed prior to* man, but that knowledge of this world did not" and (2) "It is correct to say that the continent *was there before* he sailed" with (3) "It is only when we are prisoners of dualism . . . that we view truth as the discovery of *antecedent reality*."

[7]If the experimentalist wishes to include in the idea of truth, *by definition*, the notion of use or function, one cannot gainsay him. But a shift in definition does not change the real situation; the sort of correctness to which I am pointing remains a real characteristic of (at least some) knowing situations, and any theory which does not take it into account (under some name or other) is inadequate to the facts. It seems to me that the reduction of knowledge and truth to merely a functional mode of behavior results from an a-priori imposition of biological categories, not from an original examination of the facts of our knowledge experiences. To be sure, Dewey, in the first part of *The Theory of Inquiry*, announces the imposition as a hypothesis; but in fact it serves throughout as a guide in the selection and interpretation of facts. There may, in practice, be little difference between the apriorism of the rationalists and the hypothetical apriorism of the experimentalists.

[8]At this point an extended phenomenological reflection on the experience of this "interaction" ought to be inserted. Space prohibits this; I would, however, like to make one comment. Dewey justly criticized the atomistic sense-data theory of perception which has been common to both traditional modern empiricism and modern rationalism (*The Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 154, 516-19), but his alternative theory seems to violate his own canon of criticism inasmuch at it "represents a selective extraction of some conditions and some factors. . ." (*ibid.*, p. 514). Dewey makes the rather surprising remark (*ibid.*, p. 518 n.) that William James was the first openly to deny the atomistic sense-data theory. Thomists have, in the name of experience, denied it for centuries.

"relative." Our reflection on the example has revealed that there is a sense in which "truth is the handiwork of man"; it is indeed produced through and in Columbus's knowing operation. But, if we remember *all* the factors involved in the concrete situation, it is not at all obvious that truth, *because* it is the "handiwork of man . . . must remain in a perpetual condition of verification day by day, being tested and tried in the on-going experience of man." Surely, Columbus could extend his knowledge of this land; he could make his knowledge of it richer, broader, more accurate; but with regard to the plain fact which he knew in his first encounter, "This is land," what perpetual "verification day by day" is indicated? He knew it was land; he knew he knew it; he knew he had sound evidence for it. Columbus's knowledge was once for all determined by the evidence of experience.

Moreover, the result of Columbus's experience ($contact_1$ and $contact_2$) was a permanent possession of this knowledge and truth and thereby an enduring relation of his knowing to the "land." For, withdrawing from the "interaction" itself, Columbus continued to know that the land had been found. When he returned to Spain, no longer now in active interaction with the land itself, he could yet report *correctly* to the queen that he had found land. And the "land" in this report, the land about which Columbus thought, which he meant, and which the queen understood, was the *real* land on which he had stood. After the genesis of knowledge in the interaction, an *enduring* relationship *of a different kind* remained between his "knowing" and the real existent "land." This relationship exists without the physical interaction which gave rise to it.

We have been able to analyze the knowing situation in Dr. Morris's example without introducing the idea of "functional use." The Thomist does not deny the influence of utility and purpose within human knowledge; he does not deny that certain kinds of knowledge are intrinsically ordered to activity; but the empirical examination of a wide variety of knowing situations forces him to distinguish between knowledge and truth and the use to which they are put.[7] Whether or not Columbus's knowledge ever was of any use, it would remain true to say that he knew the land and knew it correctly. Dr. Morris himself seems to be able to make the same distinction. When he writes, "It is correct to say that the continent was there before he sailed . . .," he is asserting a "correctness" which does not intrinsically include "functionally usable." The "correctness" to which he refers is a genuine aspect of real knowledge and it is this that the Thomist calls "truth." To express exactly what Dr. Morris wished to express, a Thomist could have written, "It is *true* to say . . ."

The origin of human knowledge is found by the Thomist and, I think, by the experimentalist, within an interaction ($contact_1$ and $contact_2$) be-

tween a knower and something presenting itself in operational experience.[8] In the case of Columbus, the knowledge ("This is land") arose in an interaction with the land itself. He was, therefore, in operational continuity with the land, as "a seeing organism with something seen, an eating organism with something eaten." In this respect and in this case, then, man is "within nature . . . continuous with it." I do not see what apocalyptic change of perspective is achieved in this example by saying, "*Once* man is seen within nature." As far as this act of knowledge goes, man is within nature. If one means to assert, on the evidence of *this* continuity, either that man therefore cannot have relationships which go beyond the material world or that knowing is reducible to the same level of reality as eating, then the assertion simply goes beyond the evidence. (Professor Morris writes: "The operation of knowing is merely another and higher operation performed by a natural organism." This seems to assert simultaneously reduction and nonreduction of the operation of knowing. The "higher" here certainly needs clarification.)

That a seeing organism is in continuity with the thing seen, and so on, seems obvious enough; that a knowing organism is in continuity with the thing known is obvious enough, too; but if this means that the thing seen or known had *no* antecedent reality, then it is plain idealism, and what happens then to the realism of the experimentalist? What happens to the continent which "it is correct to say was there before he sailed"? That the land was not known by Columbus before he sailed is obvious; that by knowing it he made it actually known is an Aristotelian commonplace; that by knowing it he brought either it or himself into existence seems pretty hard to accept.

Let Columbus be a cluster of operations and the land, too, a cluster of operations; before he sailed both clusters were somehow given; they existed (since operation is existence)antecedently to their interaction, and what they were before the interaction determined what happened when they interacted.

Certainly man in actual seeing, eating, knowing, is operationally unified with the natural world around him and, in this sense, he is "one" with it. But this "one" appears to be somewhat ambiguous. Columbus is operationally united with the land, but he is also different, and therefore separated, from the land. I do not see what it can mean to say, "What constitutes reality . . . is what connects things rather than what separates and distinguishes them." It seems that the antecedent differences between Columbus and the land are as much a part of reality as their interaction in $contact_1$ and $contact_2$; in fact, a more enduring part, since it continues after the interaction ceases. Moreover, the very act of knowing separates in uniting, for the knower is not the known. The

difference between "being eaten" and "eating" would appear to be rather importantly real with serious consequences. When the hunter sits down to lion steaks, the situation is really rather different from the lion sitting down to the hunter's carcass, even though in both cases they are "one."

I have been able to deal with only a very few of the issues raised by Dr. Morris. This discussion remains very incomplete; I hope, however, that it has contributed somewhat to clarification and has prepared the way for continuing discussion.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University.*

Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901-1950. **By Bertrand Russell. Ed. R. C. Marsh. New York: Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. x + 382. $4.50.**

The Problem of Knowledge. **By A. J. Ayer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. Pp. x + 258. $4.50.**

Bertrand Russell continues to command attention, this time with a collection of philosophical essays of "bygone lucubrations" (as he calls them here), through the editorial services of R. C. Marsh. The editor contributes a brief introduction to each piece, situating it within the particular phase of Russell's development and occasionally adding a polemical word about the sad state of philosophy in the non-Russellian precincts of Oxford. The collection includes the famous essay "On Denoting," in which the proposition "Scott was the author of *Waverley*" is analyzed, and also the paper in which Russell first proposed the theory of types as a means of solving contradictions in language. Perhaps the most important reprint is a new edition of the very scarce hundred-page series of lectures on the philosophy of logical atomism, delivered in 1918 and expressive of the prewar ideas assimilated from Wittgenstein.

Toward the end of these lectures, Russell broached the theory of neutral monism, which he had learned from William James. Even at this early period, however, he remained somewhat reserved about the neutral grouping of physical and mental entities, since he could never quite reconcile it with certain linguistic usages. Our ordinary, emphatic use of particulars like *here* and *this* eventually convinced Russell that we do radically distinguish between particulars and our experiencing of them. The present volume closes, appropriately enough, with an article on logical empiricism. Here we have the rare spectacle of a philosopher offering vigorous criticism of a movement for which he was at least partially responsible. He argues that we can make meaningful inductive inferences to the truth of existence-propositions by means of causal analogy, even in the absence of direct experience of particular instances. But as is usual with Russell, he shies away from pressing the study of particular instances of such inferences and returns to the inductive problem in a general way.

Professor Ayer continues his recession from the full, systematic rigor of his earlier pronouncements on the scope of logical empiricism. He

confines the present treatise almost exclusively to the immediate problems of perception, memory, and the existence of other minds, without indicating any broader consequences for philosophy. This is due not only to the increasing influence of the piecemeal approach of analytic philosophy upon Ayer but also to his Humean recognition of the challenge of skepticism and its moderating influence upon all systematic pretensions. Although he does not think that a perfectly general claim to knowledge can be sustained directly against skeptical criticism, he does suggest an indirect way of making headway in a positive direction. This is by showing our capacity for at least some knowledge on some restricted matters. Skepticism can be gradually sapped of its strength, even after one gives up hope of any spectacular refutation.

This concern to meet the skeptical challenge has convinced Ayer of the need to abandon any monistic claim to a single method and to admit explicitly the validity of several methods. The task of the philosopher is to achieve a relatively harmonious convergence of four approches to knowledge—the realistic affirmation of things as being distinct from our knowing act, the methodological type of reductionism which sees to it that inquiry does not stray too far from sense data, the scientifico-philosophical effort to legitimate the inferences we do make beyond the sense data, the descriptive analysis of the statements employed by the other three methods. By definition, the realism which Ayer recognizes is a naive affirmation of the reality of some mind-independent things, without including any explanation of how we know them. But at least we must retain the conviction in things which are not entirely reducible to sense data, in the subjective meaning. Together with Herbert Feigl, Ayer is seeking to move beyond a phenomenalism of sense data to some sort of realistic acceptance of sensible things.

On two other major issues, the present book marks a notable shift in his position. In connection with the problem of other minds, he offers a sharp criticism of the physicalistic thesis of Neurath and Carnap's earlier phase. A public language need not refer exclusively to public objects in the physical mode, such that mental states are ineffable. Private experiences can be described to some extent in a public way, without simply reducing them to modes of physical objects. Consequently, the meaning of the mental need not be confined to disposition-predicates referring to an inclination to determine the physical order. In criticizing his own former acceptance of physicalism, Ayer is also touching at this point upon the neuralgic center of naturalism. A second issue concerns the claims sometimes made for the self-sufficiency of the analytic method itself.

> The analytic method profits by being the heir of all the rest. But it comes into its inheritance only when most of the difficult work is done.

It is a weakness of some contemporary philosophers that they allow it to succeed too soon.

Ayer is here issuing a clear warning against restoring a monism of method and involuting philosophy upon itself by means of a highly cultivated analytic technique, which is empty of realistic content and inferential justification. It is good to have these measured words from a philosopher who has tested reductionism in an extreme form and who is trying to prevent analytic philosophy from formalizing itself out of business.

JOSEPH J. SIKORA, *Loyola University (Chicago).*

La nature et la portée de la méthode scientifique. **By Emile Simard. Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, 1956.**

The Manner of Demonstrating in Natural Philosophy. **By Melvin A. Glutz, C.P. River Forest, Ill.; 1956.**

This work of M. Simard is not intended primarily for specialists in the philosophy of science but rather for the information of those who are seeking to understand the place of the sciences in the sphere of general culture (p. 9).

As the author tells us, "scientific method" here means principally the method of physics. The aim is "to try to disengage in the object known . . . the part of the object in itself from the part which proceeds from our manner of attaining it" (p. 17). The author intends to consider only "fundamental points of view and notions definitively enough established in the philosophy of the sciences" (p. 9).

The method of physics is discussed from a Scholastic point of view but without explicit treatment of the relation of physics to the philosophy of nature. But this problem remains, as it must, in the background. It must arise when M. Simard attempts to liken modern physical hypotheses to the Aristotelian hypothesis (pp. 233-49). His point of view will not be accepted by those who see a distinctly new epistemological type in the modern physical hypothesis. Here, at least, the author does not seem to be in the realm of the "definitively established."

The book follows the frequent division of method according to concept, law, and theory, with a section on induction and a final section on the relative contributions of reason and experience in physics. The selected readings at the end of each chapter seem overloaded with Eddington, de Broglie, and Bernard. The positivists are not given much of a hearing, although the "operational" character of definition in physics and its close

connection with "experimental fact" are insisted upon in the author's text (pp. 41-47).

The omission of Maritain from the bibliography and from mention in the book seems scarcely understandable in view of his authority in this field. Maritain's precise statements on the mode of definition in "empiriometric science" represent a serious obstacle to M. Simard's attempt to assimilate modern physical method to Aristotelian method.

One last criticism seems necessary here. M. Simard eventually concludes that the so-called "scientific knowledge" of physics is really a composite of science and art (p. 372). This is difficult to follow and does not receive any explanation. Does he mean that physics participates in science by being part of the philosophy of nature, and in art insofar as it is a dialectical extension of the philosophy of nature? But then we would be far away from what is "definitively established."

Much of this book, however, provides a good introduction to the understanding of the procedure of physics. The distinction between experience and the "beings of reason" of physics is very sharply made and cannot help clarifying the meaning of physics to the beginner. But American readers will probably find such an introduction in a multitude of works without the language barrier, though not often perhaps in so fine a Scholastic context.

The doctoral thesis of Father Glutz seeks to trace out in detail the application of the logic of the *Posterior Analytics* to the philosophy of nature of Aristotle. It does this in a fairly straightforward manner, carrying the application down into the detailed knowledge of specific essences. Necessarily, the demonstrations begin to appear fragile at this point; but one may legitimately ask whether it could ever be otherwise. The status of modern physics and chemistry is discussed only in passing. These are regarded as sciences distinct from the philosophy of nature, though lacking the character of strict Aristotelian science. This work should prove very helpful to the teacher of the philosophy of nature, provided that the demonstrations concerning specific essences are not taken too seriously.

JOHN P. JELINEK, S.J., *Saint Louis University.*

***A Complete Index of the* Summa Theologica *of St. Thomas Aquinas.* By Roy J. Deferrari and Sister M. Inviolata Barry, C.D.P. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1956. Pp. x + 386. Paper, $20.00.**

In 1948 the editors of this volume published *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas* based on the *Summa Theologica* and selected passages of other

works of St. Thomas. The present work merely lists alphabetically the words used in the *Summa*, citing in consecutive order every article in which the given word occurs, without, however, giving any indication of its meaning(s). For the text of the *Summa* the editors have used the Leonine edition, although they have included words found only in the Vivès edition (marked with the siglum *V*) and have added as a supplement a table of the important variant readings which are found in the *apparatus criticus* of the Leonine edition. No attempt has been made to separate individual words into their inflectional forms. The citations are complete except for those words which have no philosophical significance, such as *cum*, *et*, *non* and *qui*. This truly laborious project, a work of sixteen-years' duration which involved more than one and a half million cards, will certainly be helpful in expediting the work of students of St. Thomas.

It is, however, unfortunate that at least some cross references have not been made. Thus, if one looks up *Aristoteles*, he might conclude that St. Thomas refers to Aristotle only a hundred and thirty-eight times. The notation should have been made, "See also *Philosophus*." This would involve making a division of the citations under *philosophus* so as to show where the word refers to *the* Philosopher in contradistinction to *a* philosopher. Similar divisions should have been made under other words, such as *commentator* to indicate Averroes; *iurisconsultus*, *iurisperitus*, and *legisperitus* to indicate Justinian; and *magister* to indicate Peter Lombard. The word *Cicero* should have the notation, "See also *Tullius* and *Tusculanus*."

In an extensive and detailed work such as this, it is inevitable that some typographical mistakes will occur. Thus, for example, we find under *difficiliter*, "See *dificilis*"; under *dilectus*, "See *delectus*" instead of *diligo*; under *exsistentia*, "See *exisentia*." Under *interior* is found *exterius* instead of *interius*; under *laudabilis*, *labilior* instead of *laudabilior*; under *moeror*, "See *moeror*" instead of *maeror*; under *oppono*, *opositum*; under *perduco*, *producens*. *Pareeo* appears in place of *praeeo*; *superecello*, in place of *superexcello*.

Some confusion is caused by the fact that certain words are included under the vocables from which they were originally derived: for example, *diligenter* is found under *diligo*; *coetus*, in the sense of an assembly, under *coitus*. The system of citation, although not complicated in itself, is difficult to follow because of the lengthy series of numbers which succeed one another sometimes for pages. Although it is impossible to check the accuracy of the work, it has been noticed that the references under *humilior* have been partially repeated and that at least some of the numbers have been inverted, as under *Tusculanus* 2.42.2 instead of 2.24.2.

The present book would be much more valuable for research scholars

if some subdivisions had been made under the words which occur frequently. Thus, *actus* could have had such subdivisions as *actus elicitus*, *actus formalis*, *actus humanus*, *actus imperatus*, *actus purus*, and so on; *lex* could have been divided into *lex aeterna*, *lex naturalis*, *lex positiva*, and so on. Even though these subdivisions were not complete, at least the numer of citations under the given word would have been somewhat reduced and the work of locating a particular term facilitated to a greater extent.

In spite of the many ways in which this book could have been improved, the *Index* will be of great value to students of St. Thomas and also to philologers in their study of medieval Latin. It should be put on the philosophy reference shelf of every library.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University.*

Philosophy of Science. **By Gustav Bergmann. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1957. Pp. xiii + 181. $4.75.**

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. **By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. xix + 204 (in double pagination).**

Professor Bergmann has been working for many years at the project of providing a logical-empiricist account of psychology. The present book is the first in a three-volume series which he hopes to devote to this subject. True to the logical empiricist concept of what constitutes a foundation for the behavior sciences, he devotes this first volume to an analysis of physics and to a selection of those aspects in the philosophy of physics which are indispensable for understanding psychological theories. He acknowledges that this approach assumes that there are no ultimate, logical differences between physics and psychology, and that the analytic description of the former supplies the best conceptual tools for studying the latter at a philosophical plane. No initial justification is given for this assumption, but it is claimed that the analysis of psychology and the review of alternative psychological theories which are to be supplied in the next two volumes will establish its soundness. At the present stage, however, his foundational principles can only be taken as provisional decisions about what is considered to be relevant for a physicalistic interpretation of psychological data and theories.

It will surprise no one that the relevant elements of the philosophy

of science turn out to be nothing other than the fundamental theses of logical empiricism itself. Bergmann defines philosophy of science, together with all other valid parts of philosophy, as a "purely verbal, analytic, and reflective" discipline. It is reflective in the quite special sense of having no distinctive approach to things and of being totally dependent for content and discovery upon the special sciences. The first third of the book reviews the conventional logical-empiricist doctrines on logical and descriptive words, analytic and synthetic propositions, and the two-value system. The self-conscious effort made at simplicity is carried to some rather complex pitches, but the result is a fairly standard outline of the logical bases.

The remainder of the book concentrates upon Newtonian celestial mechanics as the paradigm for every other scientific theory and as the occasion for making some long-range preparations for Bergmann's own type of psychological behaviorism. The basic concepts required for psychological study must be formulable within the framework of the Newtonian system, which, insofar as it is closed, is also mechanistic and deterministic. The dynamic aspect of mental life is to be analyzed rigorously according to the pattern of process and process laws which are formulated in terms of the temporal states of a physical system. Even at this early stage of the discussion, Bergmann has recourse to therapeutic positivism to explain opposing positions. He ascribes to William James and Dewey an obsession with an unanalyzed notion of freedom, by which he means a view of freedom which is stubbornly unresolvable into his Newtonian model and its formal language for dynamics. Similarly, he makes a preliminary attack upon Gestalt psychology for its fuzzy notions of wholes and configurations. This, in turn, means that the Gestaltists do not aim at the type of clarity established by Bergmann's physicalist meaning for configurations —"groups of physical objects and the characters, including the relational ones, they exemplify." Only that type of psychological analysis which rests on the paradigmatic nature of Newtonian mechanics, as adapted to the requirements of logical empiricism, satisfies the advance conditions laid down here for conceptual and linguistic adequacy.

Bergmann is no more successful than Frank, Neurath, and Carnap in resolving the troublesome question of the relation between common sense and physical science. In the present volume, he simply postpones the ultimate reckoning by using a deliberate ambiguity. He interprets the language of perception both realistically and phenomenalistically, drawing upon the former approach to assure his coalition with common sense and then retreating to the latter whenever the skeptical critique is permitted to operate. The improved language of this version of logical empiricism is realistic only within the context of physics and common sense, but the ideal language for the analysis of psychology is to be phenomenalistic.

Bergmann does not intend to permit this dualism to remain for very long.

> In principle, the only statements of individual fact are therefore the atomic statements of a "phenomenalistic" language. . . . "Certain" is what is described by an atomic statement of the "phenomenalistic" language.

Whereas Feigl and Ayer have recognized the incurable subjectivism of the phenomenalistic theory of atomic statements, Bergmann thinks that it is required for a philosophy of the behavior sciences which can resist the skeptical critique. How common sense so interpreted can be continuous with, and foundational for, the sciences and philosophy remains an untreated issue. The appearance of further volumes of analysis and history cannot automatically resolve the difficulty.

While most of the logical empiricists were busying themselves with applications of their doctrine to various fields, Ludwig Wittgenstein was working quietly at Cambridge University at a radical critique of the doctrine itself. The present book is not a finished product, but rather an editorial selection from a series of his manuscripts written between 1937 and 1944. Its tone and purpose are revealed in three brief sentences, which may better be called apothegms.

> The motto here is: take a *wider* look round. . . . In philosophy it is always good to put a *question* instead of an answer to a question. . . . To resolve these philosophical problems one has to compare things which it has never seriously occurred to anyone to compare.

To enter Wittgenstein's universe is to ask questions and make comparisons about matters which are usually taken for granted by philosophers today.

The central upheaval involves the very meaning of mathematical logic. What Wittgenstein questions is not the technical triumphs of this discipline, as a whole or in detail, but the customary view of is significance for mathematics. These manuscripts tell the story of his liberation from Russell, during the course of which he disturbs the one ground which Bergmann prefers to regard as quite unproblematic. Instead of providing the foundation for some special science, after the pattern of the Whitehead-Russell treatment of mathematics, he makes some interrogative remarks about the very project of giving a logical foundation to mathematics.

> What does mathematics need a foundation for? It no more needs one, I believe, than propositions about physical objects—or about sense impressions, need an *analysis*. What mathematical propositions do stand in need of is a clarification of their grammar, just as do those other propositions.

A grammatical clarification is considerably less pretentious than a founding

or an analytic reconstruction; and yet Wittgenstein believes that it comes much closer to describing what the philosophical approach to physics, mathematics, and sense perception has actually done during our century. Mathematical calculation and proof remain distinct in nature from the experiments we make with numbers, the psychological habituation that enables us to count numbers in sequence, the mechanical computers we build, and the logical calculus we develop in correspondence to mathematical inference. On the latter correspondence, Wittgenstein uses a homely but instructive example. One can wrap the table and chairs in enough paper so that, in the end, they will all look round. Similarly, one can construct logical proofs corresponding to those in mathematics, but this enveloping operation does not transform mathematical proof. One must still appeal to peculiarly mathematical reasons for accepting the correspondence as rigorous inference.

Wittgenstein does not deny the relation between the two types of proof but only that it is one of foundation. He refers to the disastrous invasion of logic into mathematics, in the twofold restricted sense that logical techniques often make us forget the mathematical way of making proof perspicuous and that logical symbolism often engenders a facile claim to comprehension of the procedures and aim of mathematical thinking. The fundamental criticism of Russell is that his theory of types does not enable us to understand the definite, complex calculations in arithmetic and that his solution of the contradictions is not at all decisive for mathematicians. Whereas some logicians are dissatisfied with the particular way in which mathematical logic handles the contradictions, Wittgenstein questions the very concentration upon the problem and its significance for constructing either mathematics or logic.

These "remarks on foundations" are intended to respect the distinctive aspects of mathematical inference; but they raise questions about other types of linguistic foundings, including the project which Bergmann proposes for psychology. As is customary in other books by Wittgenstein, the German text and the English translation appear on facing pages. The remaining manuscripts, still unpublished, apparently contain variations on the materials already in print.

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J., *Saint Louis University.*

Modern Science and Christian Beliefs. **By Arthur F. Smethurst. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1955. Pp. xx + 300. $4.00.**

Christian Theology and Natural Science. Some Questions on Their Relations. **By E. L. Mascall. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1956. xxi + 328. $4.50.**

Religion and the Psychology of Jung. **By Raymond Hostie, S.J. Trans. G. R. Lamb. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957. Pp. vi + 249. $3.50.**

Books on the interrelationships of several areas of human knowledge and interest are written in greater numbers some time after significant changes in one or more of the areas that in one way or another overlap. These three books are alike in that they attack problems of interrelationship; they differ in the approach to these problems, and they differ also in the principles of solution that they employ.

Canon Smethurst, the publishers of his book tell us, has degrees in both science (geology and geochemistry) and theology, and maintains his memberships in several scientific societies. He takes a very broad approach to the relation of science and theology, in terms of the basic nature of these two disciplines. He begins with a very general discussion of the nature of science: its presuppositions, its history, the virtues it requires in the scientist, its objects, and its limitations. In his theory of science he adopts the view (now widely held in Calvinist and Episcopalian circles) that all science rests on faith, especially on a faith in God, and on a religious attitude toward nature. He identifies this faith with the faith of Christianity and, on this score, finds not only no conflict but a harmony and even a necessary complementarity. His view includes two other related positions: that metaphysics (which, I take it, includes also the philosophy of nature) is useless at least for the solution of this problem for modern man (pp. xvii-xviii, 21-31), and that theology is only a theoretical interpretation of revelation which is accepted on faith but is never understood by man in any final form (pp. 227-48). On this basis he finds it easy to conclude that all certain and completely intelligible truth is reached by the scientific method; revelation is accepted by faith and interpreted by symbols whose meaning by its very nature can never contradict science; in turn religion fosters an attitude of reverence and provides the presuppositions upon science rests.

Canon Smethurst then considers three particular problems; in the area of physical sciences he considers briefly relativity theory, atomic and

quantum theory, entropy (which he considers to provide a proof for creation), and the size of the universe. In biological sciences he considers evolution and the problem of pain, both of which bear witness to Christianity: evolution showing the guiding presence of God, pain the work of the evil spirit. In treating of human character, he is concerned to show that modern science does not destroy freedom, responsibility, and the like.

When he considers the difficulties from the side of religion, he considers creeds and miracles. What he says about creeds we have already referred to. What he does with miracles is similar: nature-miracles are by and large myths, with a few exceptions, and these are still in some sense in harmony with nature. Most other miracles are imaginative dramatizations or cases of faith-healing. Only a few "fundamental miracles" are left, among them the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection; the author believes in these, and labors to show that these individual occurrences cannot be disproved by science.

There is no doubt that Canon Smethurst is sincere or that he has a religious attitude; about his competence as a scientist there is also no reason to doubt, though he is sometimes too ready to draw apodiptic conclusions from theories. About the adequacy of his theology I do not intend to comment (my own opinion can be gathered from other sources). The philosophy operative in the book, though not expressed as such, is a realism in which scientific method has the status of being the unique method of true knowledge; since religion is not knowledge in this sense, there is no conflict, simply because all concessions have already been made in principle.

Dr. E. L. Mascall approaches the problem in a series of detailed investigations. He also is well prepared for his task; the publishers note that he took the mathematical tripos at Cambridge, studying particularly relativity and quantum theory, and he is a well known philosopher and theologian. Dr. Mascall begins with some general considerations, in terms of contact rather than conflict. That there have been conflicts he agrees, but he shows that they were either passing or a matter of personalities. He next takes up the nature of scientific theories, in which he considers the common attitude of classical physics; some contemporary views on theories as maps or models; the exaggeration of pure positivism, and the relation between scientific theory and reality. Here Dr. Mascall holds back; a further explanation of his views would be philosophy, he says. Then he takes up his particular problems. He compares cosmological theories with the Christian doctrine of the contingency of the world and concludes that the various theories have no special implications for theism. In considering creation in relation to science, after examining

scientific theories of entropy, the origin of the universe, and conservation laws, he concludes that there are no metaphysical implications in these theories and laws. Next he takes up indeterminacy and causality, and again shows that there is no conflict between science on the one hand and philosophy and theology on the other. Next he has two chapters on man. On the body-soul relationship, he considers some philosophical theories (Cartesian dualism, monistic behaviorism) and rejects them in favor of the conclusion that man is a psychophysical unity. This conclusion, he holds, is illumined by neurophysiology but not superseded. Evolution, he holds, is entirely compatible with Christianity, though he sees no need of holding the physical unity of the human race from one pair of ancestors (holding that a "metaphysical unity" suffices). In a final chapter of impressive sweep and deep insight, he considers the purpose of creation. Here, he treats various points, such as the view that the choice between theism and naturalistic humanism is a pure option; he rejects the so-called argument from design; he looks at pain and evil theologically as a result of sin (angelic as well as human); he digresses for a few pages on the Virgin Birth, and remarks that the possibility of human parthenogenesis is irrelevant to this revealed fact; and finally shows the Christian's attitude toward the future of the human race on this earth.

This book is obviously of much greater philosophical interest than the one first examined. What will make at least some readers disappointed is a result of two things: first, Dr. Mascall's refusal to give his own philosophy of science and, secondly, his extremely detailed examination, in densely packed pages, of selected particular points. (At times, one feels he is reading a one-volume encyclopedia.) On the other hand, precisely such patient and detailed examination is a necessary preliminary to generalizations. By and large, this reviewer is in complete sympathy with Dr. Mascall's philosophy and method. It is basically a contemporary Thomism, with a philosophy of science (as far as it is expressed) that is aware of the scientists' own evaluation of the nature of the scientific effort. Some points on which I disagree are:

(*a*) Dr. Mascall suggests that the indeterminacy or probability in the microstructure of matter is determined by the Primary causality of God (pp. 200-01);

(*b*) that ancient and medieval philosophers believed that living matter could emerge from non-living without anything more than God's general concursus (p. 264)—the omission of the "separate substances" changes the doctrine radically;

(*c*) that in the first appearance of animals in the evolutionary process God "creates and attaches to [a body with an appropriate degree of physical complexity] the appropriate mental subject" (p. 269);

(*d*) that the immortality of the human soul is suggested by probable arguments (p. 271);

(*e*) and that the unity of the human race is a metaphysical one (p. 288).

Father Hostie is likewise well prepared for his work; he has a doctorate in theology and has attended the Institute for Analytical Psychology in Zurich. His subject is a particular and very limited part of the general problem of the relation between religion and science. His principles of interpretation, though similar to those of Dr. Mascall, are more explicitly expressed and more fully worked out.

After a brief introduction, which shows that Jungian psychology and religion have many points of contact, Father Hostie examines the method and nature of this psychology. Here he shows an excellent understanding of the purport of scientific law and theory, and the basic necessity of constant reference to the method by which they were obtained, not only in considering their truth-value, but, more importantly, in determining their very meaning. This is followed by a careful exposition of the fundamental views of Jungian psychology: the energic conception of the libido, imago, symbol, archetype, and individuation. This part is concluded with a consideration of the relation of Jung to other systematic psychologists, of why the attempted synthesis is not wholly successful, and of what a phenomenological psychology is. In the second part, the Jungian psychology of religion is studied, with special emphasis on Jung's view of the role that religion plays in the psychic life. This is followed by a comparison of psychotherapy and spiritual direction. The final chapter of this part compares some Jungian notions with the dogmatic and philosophical truths with which they are associated. There is a valuable bibliography.

Father Hostie's book is particularly welcome, because, on account of the nature of Jungian psychology, a number of books and articles have been written about this psychology and religion. Unfortunately, most of the writers who have touched on this relationship did not have a clear idea of the difference in meaning between scientific statements on the one hand, and religious and philosophical ones on the other. In addition, as Father Hostie points out, most of these studies neglected the chronological approach to Jung's writings. Hence, it was possible to select passages which gave quite different pictures of the relationship, and almost necessary that they should be inadequate. A series of monographs like Father Hostie's, written with the same care, based on the same adequacy of textual examination, and enlightened with the same understanding of the proper nature of scientific discourse, would in time eliminate the "conflict" of science and theology without detriment to either, but rather to the benefit of both.

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